Peeters Online Bibliographies
Peeters Publishers
this issue
  previous article in this issuenext article in this issue  

Document Details :

Title: Expressivism Detrivialized
Author(s): CANTWELL, John
Journal: Logique et Analyse
Volume: 232    Date: 2015   
Pages: 487-508
DOI: 10.2143/LEA.232.0.3144294

Abstract :
It is argued that David Lewis’ two triviality results (the probability of the conditional cannot be the conditional probability; desire cannot be belief) both present a potential problem for expressivism, are related, and can both be resolved in the same way: by allowing for gappy propositions (propositions that can lack truth value). In particular, a semantics for ‘A is good ’ is provided that allows one to embrace the major premises leading up to Lewis’ triviality result while avoiding its conclusion.

download article