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Document Details :

Title: Kant, non-conceptuele inhoud en synthese
Author(s): SCHULTING, Dennis
Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Volume: 72    Issue: 4   Date: 2010   
Pages: 697-715
DOI: 10.2143/TVF.72.4.2062397

Abstract :
Inspired by Kant’s account of intuition and concepts, John McDowell has forcefully argued that the relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism. Recently, Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have brought against this view the charge that it neglects the possibility of the existence of essentially non-conceptual content that is not conceptualized or subject to conceptualization. Their defense against McDowell amounts to non-conceptualism. Both views believe that intuition is synthesized content in Kant’s sense. In this article I am particularly interested in how their views are true to Kant. I argue that although McDowell is right that intuition is only epistemically relevant in conjunction with concepts, I also believe that Hanna and Allais are right with regard to the existence of essentially non-conceptual content, but that they are wrong with regard to intuition being synthesized content in Kant’s sense. I also point out the common failure to take account of the modal nature of Kant’s argument for the relation between intuition and concept.

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