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Document Details :

Title: Broome on Enkrasia and Akrasia
Author(s): LEE, Byeong D.
Journal: Logique et Analyse
Volume: 254    Date: 2021   
Pages: 175-189
DOI: 10.2143/LEA.254.0.3289656

Abstract :
John Broome defends what he calls ‘Enkrasia’, which is roughly this: Rationality requires of you that if you believe that you ought to do A, you intend to do A. He provides two arguments for Enkrasia. First, he argues for what he calls ‘enkratic reasoning’: ‘I ought to do A. So I shall do A’. Second, he also provides the following line of argument: Enkrasia is the requirement not to be akratic; akrasia is irrational; so Enkrasia is a rational requirement. The purpose of this paper is to show that these two arguments are not successful. For this purpose, I argue for two things. The alleged enkratic reasoning is not a genuine rule of reasoning. And it is not appropriate to understand Enkrasia in terms of akrasia, either.

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