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Title: Ramifications of Imposing Uniform Responsibility on Collective Action
Author(s): PAYETTE, Gillman
Journal: Logique et Analyse
Volume: 243    Date: 2018   
Pages: 237-268
DOI: 10.2143/LEA.243.0.3285129

Abstract :
The purpose of this paper is to explore the use of van Hees and Braham’s conception of causal responsibility in terms of NESS-conditions in formal models of collective action; NESS means ‘Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set’. In particular, the paper looks at their dictatorship result which arises from imposing uniform responsibility on game forms which are augmented with a probabilistic component. Analogs for uniform NESS-responsibility are formulated within Belnap et al.’s stit models of agency — for both the instantaneous and past-looking versions. In the case of instantaneous stit theory, NESS-responsibility has dstit as a special case, and the probabilistic component is unnecessary for deriving a full dictatorship result. For past-looking agency, NESS-responsibility has astit as a special case, but uniformity, while not dictatorial, is shown to have a counterintuitive necessary condition: busy choosers.

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