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Document Details :
Title: Brentano et l'intentionnalité des sensations
Author(s): FRÉCHETTE, Guillaume
Journal: Etudes phénoménologiques - Phenomenological Studies
Volume: 1 Date: 2017
Brentano’s thesis – the thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental – has been criticized from early on, most notably by Brentano’s students, among others Husserl and Stumpf. The central tenet of these early criticisms is that sensations should be kept out of the intentional realm in order to allow for an adequate account of intentionality. Many philosophers of mind still endorse these criticisms today. However, it is still questionable whether the early and contemporary criticisms get Brentano’s account of the intentionality of sensations right. I suggest that there is an alternative reading of the intentionality in Brentano’s Psychology that allows to distinguish between two kinds of intentionality: 1) a kind of intentionality which is fully determined by the way an intentional object is contained in an act, and 2) the kind of intentionality which is determined by the act’s attitude or modality. After providing textual and conceptual reasons for this distinction, I argue that the account based on the alternative reading avoids the criticisms mentioned above and allows for a plausible reconstruction of Brentano’s position as a contribution to inseparatism in philosophy of mind.