|previous article in this issue||next article in this issue|
Document Details :
Title: Contenu intentionnel et contenu propositionnel
Author(s): GAUVRY, Charlotte
Journal: Etudes phénoménologiques - Phenomenological Studies
Volume: 1 Date: 2017
This paper investigates one of the central concepts of the contemporary intentionalist philosophy of mind: 'intentional content'. It asks whether intentional content eo ipso means propositional content. After having shown that it makes sense to characterize the representational theories of consciousness as 'content theories' (or 'content views'), it seeks to prove that those contemporary theories lay on a semantic conception of the mental acts analysis that denies them access to the fine-grained sensible. As a consequence this paper examines Tim Crane’s alternative view which postulates that it is possible to keep the intentionalist paradigm without falling into some traps of semantics. This solution requires carefully distinguishing between two meanings of the 'content' concept: the phenomenal content of experience and the propositional content that is supposed to describe it. As a conclusion, it questions the possibility of such a distinction.