|previous article in this issue||next article in this issue|
Document Details :
Title: Truth Ascriptions, Falsity Ascriptions, and the Paratactic Analysis of Indirect Discourse
Author(s): TSOHATZIDIS, Savas L.
Journal: Logique et Analyse
Volume: 232 Date: 2015
This paper argues that the obvious validity of certain inferences involving indirect speech reports as premises and truth or falsity ascriptions as conclusions is incompatible with Davidson’s so-called 'paratactic' analysis of the logical form of indirect discourse. Besides disqualifying that analysis, this problem is also claimed to indicate that the analysis is doubly in tension with Davidson’s metasemantic views. Specifically, it can be reconciled neither with one of Davidson’s key assumptions regarding the adequacy of the kind of semantic theory he recommends nor with one of his key assumptions regarding the inadequacy of a kind of semantic theory he rejects.