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Document Details :
Title: Antwoord aan Jeroen de Ridder en René van Woudenberg
Author(s): LABOOY, Guus
Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Volume: 72 Issue: 3 Date: 2010
In ‘Een scotistisch argument voor dualisme’ (previous article in this issue) Jeroen de Ridder and René van Woudenberg argue that my argument for the ontological irreducibility of mind based on the concept of formal freedom is under-supported. In this rejoinder I start with clarifying some misunderstandings concerning the notion of formal freedom, thereby deepening our consensus on the first premise that (libertarian) freedom exists. With regard to the second premise that this (libertarian) freedom requires the ontological irreducibility of mind, I refute the idea that Non-Reductive Physicalism has provided proper instances of the concordance of freedom and physicalism (using e.g. Jaegwon Kim’s argument for the ‘epiphenomenalism of the mental’). An additional argument is refuted by pointing out that having ‘concrete imagination’ of the soul is impossible. The final comment about personal identity is clarified by highlighting the fact that I distinguish the concepts of ‘person’ and ‘individuality’ in a different way than De Ridder and Van Woudenberg do.