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Document Details : Title: In Defence of Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory Author(s): SMITH, Martin Journal: Logique et Analyse Volume: 264 Date: 2023 Pages: 327-334 DOI: 10.2143/LEA.264.0.3294240 Abstract : In a recent paper, Björn Lundgren and H. Orri Stefánsson present three objections to normic de minimis expected utility theory (NDEUT) — a decision theoretic framework defended in Smith. In this paper, I respond to these objections and outline some possible ways in which NDEUT might be modified or further developed. Like any de minimis framework, NDEUT employs a risk threshold to sort possibilities into those that must be considered when making a decision, and those that can be legitimately ignored — the so-called ‘de minimis risks’. While this threshold would usually take the form of a probability value, in NDEUT the de minimis risks are identified instead on the basis of their abnormality. In the first section I will set up some of the formalism used in NDEUT and consider Lundgren and Stefánsson’s first objection — which is essentially formal in nature. In the second section I will delve further into the interpretation of NDEUT and consider the second and third objections, which turn on particular examples. |
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