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Document Details : Title: Kant en Dilthey over tijd Author(s): WAGENAAR, Matthias Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie Volume: 78 Issue: 2 Date: 2016 Pages: 277-304 DOI: 10.2143/TVF.78.2.3175630 Abstract : This article compares the concepts of time in the works of Immanuel Kant (mainly the Critique of pure Reason) and Wilhelm Dilthey (mainly the Collected Works, volumes 5 and 19). Comparing the concept of time between two wholly different philosophical projects, we find that from a shared concept of time as a form of intuition (Anschauungsform), two very different views on psychology are implied. For Kant a moment that is in the past is essentially the same as any moment of the future. Dilthey however criticizes Kant for disregarding the fact that the future, the past, and the present differ from each other psychologically in a fundamental way. To Dilthey these different internal characteristics of time make for different domains that interrelate within one’s living psychic nexus (Lebenszusammenhang). Furthermore, this nexus is the place from which Dilthey’s entire philosophy departs from, whereas Kant fuses all perceptions into a synthesis only afterwards. This synthesis is made possible by the ‘I think’ of the apperception. Therefore, confronting Kant’s conception of time with that of Dilthey renders a critical standpoint on Kant’s implied psychology. Whereas Kant conceptualizes time almost completely intellectually, Dilthey’s concept of time depends on the intrinsic connection of time, intellect, and the psychic nexus itself. The consequence of this comes to the fore in the fact that knowledge of our psychic nexus becomes a prerequisite for understanding other beings. For example, the fact that I understand myself as being able to plan for my future, means that I’m able to think about other beings planning for their futures as well, because I project myself and my understanding onto them. However, at some point our understanding of other beings breaks off — there is no use in thinking about bricks or bacteria as having the ability for memory, at which point Kant’s intellectual concept of time makes sense. |
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