

ON DIGNĀGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION
AS PRESENTED IN PS(V) 1*

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I. Introduction

I-1. In the first chapter of his *magnum opus*, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) with its *Vṛtti* (PSV),¹ Dignāga (ca. 480–540) asserts that perception, being free of conceptual construction, takes *svalakṣaṇa* as its object-field (*viśaya*),² whereas objects other than this *svalakṣaṇa* are objects of conceptual construction, i.e., they are associated with name, genus, etc., and thus are imagined, conventionally existent, or the conceptualization of something that has been perceived earlier; he also provides a list of objects that belong to the so-called “pseudo-perception” (*pratyakṣābhāsa*).³ Thus, for Dignāga the *svalakṣaṇa* – usually translated as “particular” – is the only real object of cogni-

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¹ A new Sanskrit reconstruction based on linguistic materials collected from Jinendrabuddhi's commentary has been offered by Steinkellner; see PS(V) 1. All quotations appearing in this paper refer to this edition.

² The Sanskrit words *viśaya*, *ālambana*, and *artha* refer to the object of cognition; however they are used with some differences in meaning, for example, regarding to the difference between *viśaya* and *ālambana* Vasubandhu says: “Furthermore, what is the difference between the object-field and object-support? If one thing has activity (*kāritra*) in respect to another thing, the former has the latter as its object-field; and that which is grasped by the mind and mind-associates is the object-support.” (AKBh 19,16–17: *kaḥ punar viśayālambanayor viśeṣaḥ. yasmin yasya kāritram, sa tasya viśayaḥ. yac cittacaittair grhyate, tad ālambanam.*) In this paper I try to render these Sanskrit words with different English words: “object-field” for *viśaya*, “object-support” for *ālambana*, and “object-reference” for *artha*.

³ Cf PS(V) 1.2–3, 7cd–8ab; Hattori 1968: 24–25; 28. Cf. also Chu 2004.

tion. However, other than mentioning that *svalakṣaṇa* is “inexpressible” (*avyapadeśya*),⁴ he does not offer a clear explanation of the term.

I-2. In another part of the PS(V) 1, as we will see in the following (II-1), in talking about the *svalakṣaṇa* of cognition sphere (*āyatana*), Dignāga also states that in respect to its cognition sphere, perception is said to take the *sāmānya*, a term used here referring to many substances or atoms that constitute visible matter as a whole, as its object. This statement is criticized by his opponent as being contradictory to his refutation of an object-support (*ālambana*) that consists of many atoms. In my opinion, this problem has arisen owing to his being misunderstood as referring to the external things. However, in following I shall argue: (1) Dignāga regards the *sāmānya*, no matter how it is interpreted differently by different schools, as an internal part of a cognition, the so-called self-cognizable (*svasaṃvedya*). (2) Based on the Sautrāntika’s idea that the cognition sphere (*āyatana*) is not real, Dignāga denies the reality of an object having an external existence; and furthermore, he maintains that the self-cognizable or the internally cognizable is the source of cognition. (3) Granting the Sautrāntika’s theory of cognition having aspects (*ākāra*), he interprets the object’s aspect as the self-cognizable. Based on these points, I shall conclude that Dignāga’s theory of object of cognition presented in PS(V) 1 is consistent, and that he can be characterized as “advocator of the theory of internal object” (*antarjñeyavādin*), a term used by his commentator Jinendrabuddhi.⁵

II. *sāmānya*

II-1. In PS(V) 1.4cd-5ab, in reply to an objection to his statement that perception is free of conceptual construction, Dignāga gives some additional information about his idea of *svalakṣaṇa*. The opponent

⁴ Cf PSV 1.1,24–25 (ad PS 1.2'cd'): *svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ hy avyapadeśyavarṇatvābhyāṃ varṇādi grhītvānīyatayā cānīyaṃ varṇādīti manasā sandhatte*. Cf. Hattori 1968: 24.

⁵ See below n. 46.

argues that although it is said in the Abhidharma treatise that a sense awareness is a direct awareness of something blue, etc., and not a determination in the form “this is blue,” or a cognition of a property of the object,⁶ and thus that perception is free of conceptual construction; it is also stated in the Abhidharma treatise that the five groups of awareness take an agglomerate (*sañcita*)⁷ of atoms as their object-support.⁸ How can it be possible, the opponent asks, that these awarenesses take an agglomerate as their object-support, if they do not image it to be a unity (*ekataḥ*)? And how is it to be understood that such a sensory awareness takes the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as its object-field in respect to the particular characteristic of the cognition sphere (*āyatanasvalakṣaṇa*), and not to the particular characteristic of the substantial element?⁹ Dignāga's answer is as follows:

[Perception] is said to take the *sāmānya* as its object-field in respect to its [external] cognition sphere (*[bāhya-]āyatana*), because [perception] is produced by many substances [i.e. atoms], but not because of the conceptual construction of non-difference with respect to difference.¹⁰

II-2. Based on the original meaning of the word, Jinendrabuddhi, the only Indian commentator of Dignāga's PS(V), interprets *sāmānya* in

⁶ Cf. PSV 1.2,20–21: *abhidharme 'py uktam – cakṣurvijñānasamaṅgī nīlaṃ vijānāti na tu nīlam iti, arthe 'rthasañjñī na tu dharmasañjñī iti.*

⁷ Dignāga uses the word *sañcita* in the sense of *samudāya*, as Jinendrabuddhi says. See below n. 25 and n. 40.

⁸ Cf. AKBh 34,1–2: *na caika indriyaparamāṇur viṣayaparamāṇur vā vijñānaṃ janayati, sañcitāśrayālanbanatvāt pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānām.* “No single atom of the sense faculty or a single atom of the object-field can produce awareness, because the five groups of awareness have the agglomerate of [atoms] as their basis [of cognition, i.e. the sense faculty] (*āśraya*) and object-support.”

⁹ Cf. PSV 1.2,22–23: *kathaṃ tarhi sañcitālanbanāḥ pañca vijñānakāyāḥ, yadi tad ekato na vikalpayanti. yac cāyatanasvalakṣaṇaṃ praty ete svalakṣaṇaviṣayā na dravyasvalakṣaṇam iti.*

¹⁰ PSV 1.2,25–26 (ad PS 1.4cd): *anekadravyotpādyatvāt tat svāyatane sāmānyaviṣayam uktam, na tu bhinneṣy abhedakalpanāt.* Cf. also PV 3.196: *aññānāṃ sa viśeṣas ca nāntareṇāparānaññin / tadekānyamāḥ jñānam uktam sāmānyagocaram //* “And the special quality of atoms [of producing cognition] cannot [occur] without other atoms. Thus, since the cognition is not restricted to a single [atom], it is said to have the *sāmānya* as its cognition sphere.” (Cf. also the translations in Dreyfus 1997: 87–88 and in Dunne 2004: 396–7.)

the sense of the “common property” of all the atoms constituting an agglomerate and their thus becoming the cognition sphere, i.e., the object of awareness. He writes:

These many atomic things, expressed [collectively] by the word “agglomerate” (*sañcita*) and the word “particular characteristic of cognition sphere,” are common by being similar in the capacity of producing corresponding awareness in dependence on each other. A **common property** is indeed common [to many things] ... [followed by a grammatical explanation]¹¹

That is to say, cognition is produced by atoms, all of which have the common property in their being capable of producing a cognition; thus they are collectively the object-cause (*ālambanapratyaya*) of cognition and the single word “agglomerate” can be used for them. Jinendrabuddhi emphasizes that Dignāga’s reason for using the term *sāmānya* is to eliminate the restriction (*niyama*) of the object of a cognition to a single atom-substance. Nevertheless, this does not imply, through the usage of the word *sāmānya*, that the perception takes the universal characteristic of many atoms as its object-field: thus the contradiction mentioned by the opponent does not exist. At another point, in explaining why it is said in the Abhidharma treatise that the five groups of awareness take an agglomerate as their object-support, Jinendrabuddhi expresses also this idea:

Those atoms, generated through their own causes and conditions, inasmuch as each being capable of producing awareness when they are situated in close proximity to each other, are called “**agglomerate**” (*sañcita*)... For by virtue of the conditions of getting close to each other they are agglomerated, gathered together. Through these many atoms in such a state, [the five groups of awareness] that bear their own appearance are produced. Therefore, it is said: “[**the five groups of awareness**] **take the agglomerate as object-support**” in consideration [of the fact] that [these awarenesses] sup-

¹¹ PST 45,11–12: *yat tat sañcitaśabdenāyatanaśvalakṣaṇaśabdena coktam anekaṃ paramāṇuvastu tad eva pratīniyatavijñānajananasāmarthyena sādharmyeṇa parasparāpekṣayā samānam. samānam eva sāmānyam, ...*

port themselves, without distinction, on all these [atoms], called “agglomerate,”¹² but definitely not on a single substance.¹³

This *sāmānya* is also interpreted by Manorathanandin in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's PV. In comparison to that of Jinendrabuddhi, his interpretation is quite simple. According to him, taking *sāmānya* as the operation-sphere means taking the agglomerate, namely a kind of collection (*saṅghāta*) of atoms, as the operation-sphere and not the universal (*sāmānya*), which is different from the individual atoms. Thus the undesired consequence (*prasaṅga*), i.e., the self-contradiction, would not follow, namely, such a perception would be accompanied by conceptual conception on account of having taken the universal as its object.¹⁴

II-3. Dignāga's above statement, which is in fact based on Vasubandhu's idea as stated in the AKBh,¹⁵ is interpreted by Jinendrabuddhi

¹² I do not follow the Tibetan translation which corresponds to: *sarvāṃs tān sañcitā-khyānaviṣeṣeṇālbante*. Cf. PST^T D 21b5–6: *de rnam thams cad la 'ang bsags pa zhes bya ba 'i khyad par gyis dmigs pa ste...*

¹³ PST 44,12–45,5: *svahetupratyayebhyo ye paramāṇavo jāyante, te 'nyonyasannidhānāvasthāprāpiā eva santaḥ pratyekaṃ vijñānopajānanasamarthāḥ sañcitasabdenoktāḥ ... parasparopasarpanapratyayair hi te sañcitāḥ saṃhatīkṛtāḥ. tais tathāvidhair anekaiḥ svapratibhāsā janyanta iti sañcitālbana ity uktāḥ, sarvāṃs tān sañcitākhyān aviṣeṣeṇālbante, naikam eva dravyam iti kṛtvā.*

¹⁴ Cf. PVV ad PV 3.196: *sāmānyagocaram sañcitaparamāṇusaṅghātaviṣayaṃ jñānam uktaṃ tattvavādīnā, na tu paramāṇvatīrīktasāmānyaviṣayaṃ. tat kathaṃ sāmānyaviṣaya-tvāt savikalpatvaprasaṅgaḥ.* (For the analysis of the compound *sañcitaparamāṇusaṅghātaviṣayaṃ* cf. AKBh 23,24: *pañcendriyadhātavaḥ pañca viṣayāḥ sañcitāḥ, paramāṇusaṅghātavāt.*)

¹⁵ Cf. AKBh 7,22–24: *nanu caivaṃ samastālbana-tvāt sāmānyaviṣayāḥ pañca vijñānakāyāḥ prāpnuvanti na svalakṣaṇaviṣayāḥ. āyatanasvalakṣaṇaṃ praty ete svalakṣaṇaviṣayā iṣyante na dravyasvalakṣaṇam ity adoṣaḥ.* “[Objection:] Since in this circumstance the five groups of [sensory] awareness take an aggregate (*samasta*) [of atoms] as their object-support, they must take the universal (*sāmānya*) as their object, not the particular (*svalakṣana*). [Reply:] In respect to the particular characteristic of the cognition spheres, these [five groups of sensory awareness] are accepted as having the particular characteristics [of the cognition spheres] as their objects, not in respect to the particular characteristic of the substances [viz. an atoms]. Therefore the fault does not exist.” Cf. Hattori 1968: 26 §Dab, and 89, n. 39. Cf. also MVBh 65a12–16: 問云何身識緣共相境。以五識身緣自相故。答自相有二種。一事自相。二處自相。若依事自相說者。五識身亦緣共相。若依處自相說。則五識緣自相。故不相違。“Question: ‘Why does tactile awareness take the

as an attempt to solve the problem that the perception of an object consisting of many atoms would be not free of conceptual construction. However, another serious problem arises. As pointed out by Hattori,¹⁶ Dignāga's idea as stated here is vehemently attacked by Mallavādin in NC 86,6ff. The troublesome point is as follows: to say that perception is produced by many atoms and therefore takes the *sāmānya* of these atoms as its object seems to be similar to the thesis Dignāga himself criticizes in the ĀP(V) and in PS(V) 1.14ff, regardless of whether it is referring to all things possessing the common property of being capable of producing a cognition, as interpreted by Jinendrabuddhi, or simply to the entire collection of all atoms, as interpreted by Manorathanandin. Thus it seems to contain a self-contradiction in another sense. I shall argue in following discussion that this is actually a misunderstanding of Dignāga's idea on the part of his opponents because of their realistic viewpoint.

II-4. Here, before we begin to discuss the problem of the *sāmānya*, it is necessary to outline the thesis Dignāga criticizes, first in the ĀP(V) and then again in PS(V) 1.14ff., for this is the starting point of the discussion. It is well known that in the ĀP, Dignāga presents the theory that expresses the two conditions a thing must fulfill to be an object of cognition, i.e., (1) it must be a real existence so that it can produce the cognition with its own form and thus be a real cause of cognition; (2) it must have a gross form so that the cognition can bear its appearance.¹⁷ There are three different alternatives to inter-

universal as its object-support, since the five kinds of awareness take the particular as their object-support?' Answer: There are two kinds of the particular, one is the particular characteristic of substance (*dravyasvalakṣaṇa*), the other is the particular characteristic of the cognition sphere (*āyatanasvalakṣaṇa*). In respect to the particular characteristic of substance, the five kinds of awareness take also the universal as their object-support, in respect to the particular characteristic of the cognition sphere, the five kinds of awareness take only the particular characteristic [of the cognition sphere] as their object-support. Therefore, there is no contradiction."

¹⁶ Cf. Hattori 1968: 90, n.1.41.

¹⁷ Cf. ĀPV 176,12–13: *yul zhes bya ba ni shes pas rang gi ngo bo nges par 'dzin pa yin te de'i mam par skye ba'i phyir ro* // "[We call something] object-field (*viṣaya*), because

pret the object-support (*ālambana*), as stated both in ĀP(V) and then again in PS(V) 1.14ff., but none of them can fulfill both of these conditions. The first alternative can fulfill only the first condition; it holds that the object-support is the things as they are, i.e., the atoms of color, etc., which become the cause of the cognition, even though the cognition bears a different appearance than what they really are.¹⁸ And the other two alternatives can fulfill only the second condition; both of them maintain that the object-support is that with the appearance of which the cognition arises with respect to the color, etc.¹⁹ According to the materials available to us, each of these alternatives has been advocated by certain Indian philosophical schools at various points in time. The first one is mentioned in the VŚ as being held by the Vaiśeṣika.²⁰ This alternative does not need to be discussed here, because the school advocating it is not the school under examination. The second and third alternatives agree on one point – a cognition bears the appearance of the object-support, and this appearance is produced by many atoms; they disagree only on the nature of the appearance, i.e., whether it is of an agglomerate of atoms as a whole, or of many individual atoms that are gathered together. These two alternatives are attributed by the commentaries to the Sautrāntika²¹ and the Vaibhāṣika/Neo-Sarvāstivāda respectively,²² and thus I will refer to them in this paper as the “Sautrāntika-theory” and the “Sarvāstivāda-theory.” These two theories are described in the PSV as follows:

the cognition, grasping it as its proper form (*svarūpa*), arises with the aspect (*ākāra*) of this [object-field].”

¹⁸ Cf. PSV 1.6,8–9: *yathāvidyamānā anyābhāsasyāpi vijñānasya kāraṇaṃ bhavanti.*

¹⁹ Cf. PSV 1.6,7–8: *yadābhāsaṃ teṣu jñānam utpadyate, tathā ta ālambanam ...*

²⁰ Cf. VŚ 6,27–28: *yat tad rūpādīkam āyatanaṃ rūpādivijñaptinām pratyekaṃ viṣayaḥ syāt tad ekaṃ vā syād yathāvayavirūpaṃ kalpyate vaiśeṣikāih.* However, according to Kui ji, the Chinese commentator of Xuan zang's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, this is advocated by Sāṃmitīya. Cf. CWSLSJ 269c16: 此中唯破正量部.

²¹ Cf. TrBh 16,20–21: *sañcitālambanāś ca pañcavijñānakāyās tadākāratvāt.* “And the five group of awareness have the agglomerate [of atoms] as their object-support, for [awareness] has the appearance of that [agglomerate].” Cf. Kui ji's CWSLSJ 270a14: 此牒經部師計... Cf. also de la Vallée Poussin 1928: 43.

²² See n. 29, 31.

[Sautrāntika-theory:] If cognition arises from those [color, etc.] in the form as [they] appear, then the object-support exists only conventionally, since in this case the five groups of awareness take an agglomerate (*sañcita*) [of atoms] as their object-support.²³

[Sarvāstivāda-theory:] To be sure (*kāmaṃ*), in the case of the awarenesses with appearances of something blue, etc., the awareness produced from that object [i.e. the atoms of something blue] must be the perception. That is to say, in these [awarenesses with appearances of something blue, etc.], even though the gathering (*samudāya*) of those [atoms] is nominally existent, the aspect (*ākāra*) of what substantially exists [i.e., each atom] is found.²⁴

II-5. Jinendrabuddhi does not offer a detailed explanation concerning the Sautrāntika-theory, but just paraphrases the word *sañcita* used by Dignāga with *samūha*, and adds that if we have in mind that the term “things agglomerated” (*sañcita*) has the same meaning as the term “agglomerate of the things” (*sañcaya*); and thus *sañcaya* means *samūha*.²⁵ However, interestingly, he attributes the Sarvāstivāda-theory to “the advocators of the theory of objects having the aspect of many [substances/atoms]” (*anekākārārthavādin*),²⁶ and says that they hold the following opinion:

Surely, the atoms which are definitely substantially existent have such an aspect (*ākāra*). Precisely those atoms, inasmuch as they support one another

²³ PSV 1.6,10–11: *yadi yathābhāsaṃ teṣu jñānam utpadyate, tathā sañcitālambanatvāt pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānāṃ saṃvṛtisad evālambanam iti.*

²⁴ PSV 1.6,12–13: *kāmaṃ nīlādyaḥbhāseṣu vijñāneṣu tato 'rthād utpannaṃ vijñānaṃ pratyaḥṣaṃ syāt. tathā hi teṣu tatsamudāye prajñaptisaty api dravyasadākāro labhyate.*

²⁵ PST 91,13–14: *sañcitālambanatvād iti samūhālambanatvāt sañcitam sañcaya iti kṛtvā. sañcayaś ca samūhaḥ.*

²⁶ The Tibetan translation of this term, *rnam pa du ma'i don du smra ba* (PST^T D 42a3), “the advocator of the theory of object with multiple aspects,” seems incorrect to me. The relation between *aneka* and *ākāra* should be a Tatpuruṣa, not a Karmadhārya, and thus *aneka* should refer to “many atoms.” Cf. *dravyasatām eva sa paramāṇūnām ākāraḥ* quoted in n. 28.

(*parasparānuḡḥīta*),²⁷ appear [to cognition] in this way [i.e., with this aspect].²⁸

Kui ji, the commentator of Xuan zang, identifies the advocator of this opinion as Saṅghabhadra (眾賢) who is called “Neo-Sarvāstivādin.”²⁹ However, as Katō has already pointed out,³⁰ Vinītadeva attributes this opinion to “Vāgbhaṭa and others” (*pha khol la sogs pa*).³¹

²⁷ But in PST 44,13, where Dignāga's own position is explained, *anyonyasannidhānāvasthā* is used, cf. n. 13.

²⁸ PST 92,2–5: *nanu dravyasatām eva sa paramāññām ākāraḥ. ta eva hi parasparānuḡḥītās tathā pratibhāsanta ity anekākārthavādinah...* (cf. Vinītadeva's description of this opinion quoted in n. 31.) This idea is reported and criticized also in Sthiramati's TrBh and Xuan zang's CWSL. Cf. TrBh 16,26–27: *ekaikaparamāñur anyanirapekṣo atūndriyaḥ, bahavas tu parasparāpekṣā indriyagrāhyāḥ*. The same idea is also found in CWSL 4b: 有執色等一一極微。不和集時非五識境。共和集位展轉相資有龜相生。為此識境。彼相實有。為此所緣。The word *parasparāpekṣā* (cf. *phan tshun nye bar 'gro ba* in PVP: 221a4, ad PV 3.196) should be understood as interchangeable with *parasparānuḡḥīta* (= *phan tshun phan btags pa*) in the PST.

²⁹ Cf. CWSLSJ 271a10: 此第四敘眾賢論師新薩婆多義。Cf. Cox's remark: “Though Saṅghabhadra's interpretations are generally consistent with the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position, especially as presented in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, he is influenced by Vasubandhu's criticisms and attempts to reformulate many Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika positions in response to them... Saṅghabhadra's works mark a turning point in the development of Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika thought; as a result, Saṅghabhadra is acknowledged as the inaugurator of the so-called 'neo-Vaibhāṣika' period.” (Cox 1995: 58) Cf. de la Vallée Poussin 1928: 45, n.1.

³⁰ Cf. Katō 1973: 134, Katō 1989: 179.

³¹ Cf. ĀPT 189a7-b2): *phyi rol gyi don du smra ba'i phyogs 'di la yang / pha khol la sogs pa kha cig / rdul phra rab rnam 'dus pa'i rnam pa dag dbang po'i rnam par shes pa'i rgyur 'dod do // de dag 'di skad rdul phra rab rnam la ni 'dus pa'i rnam pa yang yod do // rdul phra ba rnam la gang cung zad cung zad du ci yod pa thams cad ni rdzas su yod pa yin no // rdzas su yod pa'i phyir 'dus pa'i rnam pa rnam par shes pa'i rgyu nyid du 'gyur ro // rags pa'i phyir na rnam par shes pa la rang gi ngo bo yang 'jog par 'gyur te / de bas na rdul phra rab rnam tshul gzhan gyi yul nyid yin no zhes zer ro //* Also among the adherents of the theory of [the existence of] the external object-reference (*bāhyārthavāda*), some [masters], Vāgbhaṭa and others, hold that the gathered aspects of atoms are the cause of the sensory awareness. They say: “Atoms have also the gathered aspect. Everything, what ever exists among atoms as single particle, is substantially existent. Because of being substantially existent the aspect of gathered [atoms] is the cause of the awareness, because of the gross form (*sthūla*) it makes the awareness obtain its proper form (*svarūpa*). Therefore, the atoms are the object-field [of the cognition] in a different way [than what they exist].”

II-6. From the report given in Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra* (NA), we know that there was a sharp controversy on the topic of the object of cognition between the Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika (hereafter only "Sautrāntika") and the Sarvāstivāda/Vaibhāṣika (hereafter only "Sarvāstivāda"). According to Saṅghabhadra, the Sautrāntika's opinion, advocated by "the venerable" (*sthavira*) – a title used to refer to Śrīlāta³² – is as follows:

In this regard the venerable (*sthavira*, i.e. Śrīlāta) holds the following opinion: Neither the basis [*āśraya*, i.e. the sense faculty] nor the object-support (*ālambana*) of the five groups of [sensory] awarenesses are real existence, because each individual atom cannot be the basis and object-support [of those awarenesses], and because only an agglomerate (和合) of many atoms can constitute a basis and object-support. ... They, the master and the followers, also used worldly examples incorrectly; they use the simile of blind men to prove their doctrine. It is said: Like blind men, who if separate and alone, have no action of perceiving a visible form; when they gather together (和集), they still have no action of perceiving. Atoms are the same: when they are separate and alone, they do not perform the function of basis and object-support; when many [atoms] are gathered together, they still do not perform such a function. Therefore, the cognition spheres (*āyatana*, i.e., the sense faculties and their objects) are unreal; only the constituent elements (*dhātu*) are real.³³

This is to say, the Sautrāntika holds that neither sense faculties nor object-support really exist, because as an agglomerate they can be reduced to atoms. Actually in AKBh, in reporting a debate on what is the agent and what is the object of cognition, Vasubandhu ascribes to the Sautrāntikas the opinion that this kind of debate is useless, for the visual awareness arises in dependence on the visual sense and the visual matters, there is nothing that sees or is seen, there is merely

³² The *sthavira* mentioned in the NA is identified in the later sources as Śrīlāta, a Sautrāntika master (cf. Cox 1988: 71, n. 9.). Kui ji, for instance, identifies him as Śrīlāta, the second of "the three Sautrāntika masters," who composed the Sautrāntika-Vibhāṣā. Cf. CWSLSJ 358a,11–12: 二室利邏多。造經部毘婆沙。正理所言上座是。

³³ Cf. NA 350c5–17: 五識依緣俱非實有。極微一一不成所依所緣事故。眾微和合。方成所依所緣事故。……又彼師徒串習世典。引眾盲喻。證已義宗。傳說。如盲一一各住。無見色用。眾盲和集。見用亦無。如是極微一一各住。無依緣用。眾多和集。此用亦無。故處是假。唯界是實。 Cf. Dhammajoti 2004: 89, also Dhammajoti 2004a: 20.

the *dharma* that is devoid of any activity, and there is merely cause and effect.³⁴

Saṅghabhadra himself, supporting Sarvāstivāda, holds the following opinion:

The five groups of awareness do not take non-reality as their object-support, because they take the gathered atoms (和集極微) as their object-support. And because the five groups of awareness (**pañcaviññānakāya*) are free of conceptual construction, they do not take an agglomerate of many atoms (眾微和合) as their object. There is no other kind of *dharma* that is called “agglomerate” and that can be an object seen by, [heard by, smelled by, tasted by,] up to touched by an [awareness] that is free of conceptual construction (**nirvikalpaka*), because that agglomerate is nothing other than that which is grasped by the discriminating imagination (**abhinirūpaṇavikalpa*). But the five groups of awareness do not have the function of discriminating, [and] therefore they do not take an agglomerate as their object. That is to say, the atoms, inasmuch as they are gathered together and structured [in a certain way] (**sanniviṣṭa*), are always the basis and object-supports for the arising of the five groups of awareness, because there is no atom that is not gathered; even if atoms were not gathered, they would still be the basis and the object-support because they have the same nature. However, because the five groups of awareness exclusively (**eva*) take gathered [atoms] as their object-support, they do not arise in taking that [agglomerate] as an object-support.³⁵

Here, the Sautrāntika-theory is criticized: an agglomerate of atoms cannot be an object-support because it is grasped by conceptual construction, but the five groups of sensory awareness are free of conceptual construction. We shall see below that Dignāga's opponents also criticize him in this way. For Saṅghabhadra, atoms are always a real existent. The difference between the state of being gathered and

³⁴ AKBh 31,12–14: *atra sautrāntikā āhuḥ – kim idam ākāśaṃ khādyate. caḥsur hi pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate caḥsurvijñānam. tatra kaḥ paśyati, ko vā drśyate. nirvyāpāraṃ hīdaṃ dharmamātraṃ hetuphalamātraṃ ca.* Cf. Dhammajoti 2004: 51–52.

³⁵ NA 350c19–27: 五識不緣非實有境。和集極微為所緣故。又五識身無分別故。不緣眾微和合為境。非和合名別目少法可離分別所見乃至所觸事成。以彼和合無別法故。唯是計度分別所取。五識無有計度功能。是故不緣和合為境。即諸極微。和集安布。恒為五識生起依緣。無有極微不和集故。設有極微不和集者。是彼類故。亦屬依緣。然五識身。唯用和集為所緣故。不緣彼起。

not gathered is that the former is invisible, but the latter is visible; the nature of being a real existent of the two states is the same.³⁶

II-7. The passages of NA quoted above suggest that the two words, *he-he* (和合) and *he-ji* (和集), used in this context separately for the Sautrāntika-theory and Sarvāstivāda-theory, were two different words in the original Sanskrit text, and therefore, some modern scholars hold that *he-he* and *he-ji* refer to two different theories being advocated by the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda, and also suggest that their Sanskrit origins were different.³⁷

Of course, *he-he* and *he-ji* used in Saṅghabhadra's context clearly refer to two different things. According to my understanding, *he-he* refers to a state in which many atoms are integrated into a single unity with no space between them, and *he-ji*, a state in which many atoms are merely gathered, but with spaces in-between. This kind of difference, as implied by the two words used for the two theories, is also mentioned by Vinītadeva in his commentary on the VŚ:

[The gross form such as a color, etc.,] as many atoms standing with inter-space (**sāntara*), cannot be an object-field; it cannot be an object-field also as atoms standing without inter-space (**nirantara*).³⁸

Kui ji interprets *he-ji* as follows:

³⁶ NA533a10-11: 不和集時。其體雖有。細故不見。便非顯色。

³⁷ Cf. the discussion of these two words in Katō 1973: 137, Katō 1989: 180. According to him, the original forms of *he-ji* used by Sarvāstivāda and *he-he* used by Sautrāntika could be respectively **sañcita* and **saṃhata*, the latter is used in VŚ for the Sautrāntika-theory; and it is also possible, Katō suggests again, based on the statement in Abhidharmadīpa, that the venerable Vasumitra (*sthaviravasumitra*), one of the four great masters of the Sarvāstivāda, refutes the twenty-five true principles (*tattva*) of Sāṅkhya and destroys the Sautrāntika-theory of the agglomerate of atoms, mentioned as *paramānusañcayavāda* (AD 260,14-15: *tad ebhyaḥ caturbhyaḥ sarvāstivādebhyaḥ tṛīṇaḥ sthaviravasumitraḥ pañcaviṃśatitattvanirāsī paramānusañcayavādonmārthī ca...*), that Sautrāntika's *he-he* is the renderings for *sañcaya*. Cf. also Cox 1988: 74, n. 23. However, as we have seen above (n. 23 and n. 24), in Dignāga's PSV, *sañcita* is used for the Sautrāntika-theory, and *samudāya* for Sarvāstivāda-theory; they are translated in Tibetan respectively as *bsag pa* and *tshogs/tshogs pa* (see Hattori 1968: 188,16b4-5, 189,97a6-7.)

³⁸ VŚ† 219a1-2 : *rdul phra rab phrag can du gnas du ma yang yul ma yin no // du phra rab dag bar med par gnas pa yang yul ma yin te /*

In the proximity of the same place is called *he* [**saṃ-*], not integrated into a single entity is called *ji* [*-*udāya*]; this is because they [i.e. atoms] are put in proximity, but they are different entities.³⁹

II-8. Nevertheless, I do not think that these two words under discussion were **necessarily** different words in the Sanskrit original. Or if they were indeed different words, then they must have had the same meaning. The reason is as follows. First of all, Jinendrabudhi regards all of the words in this semantic group to be synonyms.⁴⁰ And if we analyze the compounds used by Saṅghabhadra, *zhong-wei he-he* (眾微和合) and *he-ji ji-wei* (和集極微), we find that the syntactic relationship between the two elements of each compound is different. This difference is expressed through the different word orders in which these two elements are arranged. In the case of *zhong-wei he-he*, we arrive at something like *paramāṇusañcita*, *-saṅghāta*, or *-sañcaya*, which all appear in the AKBh,⁴¹ or *paramāṇūnāṃ saṅghātaḥ*, which appear in VŚ 7,11; thus the syntactic relationship between the two elements is that *paramāṇu* depends on *sañcita* or its variants which as a noun is the modified element, and the meaning therefore is “an agglomerate of many atoms.” In the case of *he-ji ji-wei*, we arrive at something like *saṃhatāḥ paramāṇavaḥ*, which appears in VŚ 6,29, or *paramāṇuḥ saṅghātaḥ* in VŚ 8,6, or the plural form *paramāṇava eva sañcitāḥ*, which appears in TrBh 16,23–24; in this case the syntactic relationship is that *saṃhata* or *saṅghāta* as an attribute modifies *paramāṇu*, and thus the meaning becomes “gathered atoms.” The difference between these two theories would thus not **necessarily** be demonstrated through using different words, but rather through the different syntactical relationships between the two elements, i.e., through the different emphasis, whether on the agglomerate, as in the case of the Sautrāntika-theory or on the atoms themselves, as in the case of the Sarvāstivāda-theory.

³⁹ Cf. SWLSJ 217a18–19: 一處相近名和。不為一體名集。即是相近。體各別故。

⁴⁰ Cf. PST 44,1–2: *sañcitaśabdena samudāya ucyaṭe, bhāve niṣṭhāvidhānāt. sañcitiḥ sañcitaṃ sañcayaḥ samudāya iti hi paryāyāḥ.*

⁴¹ See Hirakawa 1973: 225. Cf. also n. 14.

Xuan zang also uses the two words, *he-he* and *he-ji*, in his translations of other texts in which only one word is used in the original. For example, in the Tibetan translation of the *ĀP(V)*, the one term *'dus pa* is used for both theories; however, Xuan zang translates this single word with either *he-he* or *he-ji*. Also in the Sanskrit text of *VŚ* 11 with its *Vṛtti*, only one word, *saṃhatā*, is used, which is translated in Tibetan as *'dus pa*;⁴² however, again Xuan zang translates it with different words: “*he-he*, etc.” (和合等) in the verse, and “*he-he* and/or *he-ji*” (和合及和集, 和合和集, 和合或和集) in the *Vṛtti*.⁴³ Of course, the short form “*he-he*, etc.” is the same as “*he-he* and/or *he-ji*,” it being abbreviated for metrical reasons. In this case, Xuan zang regards *saṃhata* as referring to a kind of collection that comprises the meanings of both *he-he* and *he-ji*. In short, Xuan zang’s translations of these two terms are of an explanatory nature.

II-9. Indeed, this kind of difference, i.e., an agglomerate of atoms or gathered atoms, is significant only for the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda, as Bāhyārthavāda; both hold that the object-support is the external existent. This difference is not significant for the Yogācāra, the Antarjñeyavāda. For the latter, the object-support, regardless of whether it is “an agglomerate of atoms” or “gathered atoms,” does not exist separately from an awareness; its external form is merely an image or aspect (*pratibhāsa/ākāra*) produced by the awareness. The main purpose of *PS(V)* 1.14ff. is to refute the Bāhyārthavāda, the theory that the object of cognition exists externally, and therefore the words used there, according to Jinendrabuddhi, are synonymous. Jinendrabuddhi tells us:

In this regard, the disputants are divided into two groups: Those who advocate [that the object-support is] an internal cognizable (*antarjñeyavādin*) and those who advocate [that the object-support is] an external object (*bāhyārthavādin*). Of these [two groups], for those who advocate [that the object-support is] the internal cognizable, in the state that the reality is not perceived, the [distinction between] the valid cognition and the cognizable object, is only an imperfect [view] according to reality. Only people who are

⁴² Cf. *VŚ*^T 7b3–4.

⁴³ Cf. *VŚ*^C 75c17–25. Cf. Katō 1973: 137, n. 28, Katō 1989: 179–180.

confused have this view of distinction between a valid cognition and a cognizable object, based on their [false] vision. This has already been explained.⁴⁴ Those who advocate [that an object is] an external object assert that there are external cognizable objects absolutely in the sense of ultimate reality and the valid cognition which takes that [object] as its object-field. In order to explain how this [view] is incorrect, now he [Dignāga] says the following, in order to undertake an examination with reference to the object-support: “**However, with reference to color-form, etc. the meaning of the object-support should be explained.**” (PSV ad PS 1.14cd⁴⁵).⁴⁶

At the beginning of this section Dignāga states his hesitation in accepting the popular saying that the *Vādavidhi* is a work of Vasubandhu, holding that this is not to be accepted, or, if it is accepted, an affirmation must have been made by Vasubandhu himself that this work lacks quintessence.⁴⁷ On the last point of this statement Jinendrabuddhi offers a remark, saying that even if it is accepted that this work is composed by him, it must be composed in his earlier life when his insight is not perfect; later, being purified in understanding, he made the affirmation of the lack of the quintessence in this work.⁴⁸ That is to say, if the *Vādavidhi* is composed by Vasubandhu, it must be composed by him when he was still a Bāhyārthavādin; later, when he became an Antarjñeyavādin, he changed his opinion. Thus, the central topic in the section beginning with PS 1.14 is a refutation of the statement found in the *Vādavidhi*, which is formulated according to Bāhyārthavāda doctrine, that perception is an awareness arising directly from a certain object-reference (*tato 'rthād vijñānaṃ pratyakṣam*). Jinendrabuddhi emphasizes that the

⁴⁴ Cf. PST 73,10–74,1.

⁴⁵ Cf. Hattori 33 §D.

⁴⁶ PST 90,6–11: *iha dvaye vādino 'ntarjñeyavādino bāhyārthavādiṅ ca. tatrāntarjñeyavādinām adṛṣṭatattvāvasthāyām pramāṇaṃ prameyaṃ cāpariniṣpannam eva tattvataḥ. kevalaṃ bhrāntānām yathādarśanam idaṃ mānameyavyavasthitidarśanam. etac ca prāg eva pratipāditam. bāhyārthavādiṅ tu paramārthata eva bāhyaṃ prameyaṃ tadviśayaṃ ca pramāṇam icchanti. tac ca yathā na yujyate, tathā pratipādayitum idānīm ālambanādhi-kāreṇa vicāram ārabdhum āha – rūpādiṣu tv ālambanārtho vaktavya iti.*

⁴⁷ PS 1.13ab: *na vādavidhir ācāryasyāsāro veti niścayaḥ |*

⁴⁸ PST 86,10–12: *yady api ca tena sa viracitaḥ, tathāpi prathamam anupajātaprajñāti-śayena satā. paścād vyavadātābuddher asya tatrāsāraniścayo jāta iti.*

purpose of this section is not merely to refute the theory of the *Vāda-vidhi*, but to demonstrate in general that the division of cognition and its object, based on the assumption that the object exists externally, is incorrect. He says again that in this regard, among those who advocate that objects exist externally, the Buddhists (*svayūthyāḥ*, i.e. the Hīnayānists) are very strong, and when they are defeated, the others will also be defeated, just as when the chief wrestler is defeated, the other wrestlers are also defeated; therefore the only opponent in his discussion is the Buddhist who advocates that objects of cognition exist externally.⁴⁹ Here *svayūthyāḥ* apparently refers to the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika. Actually, the refutation of the object-support was carried out in different steps: First, the theory of the object-support as advocated by the non-Buddhists, the Vaiśeṣikas, who hold that the externally existent atoms, even if not in a gross form, are the object-support, is refuted from the standpoint of the Buddhist, the Sarvāstivāda, who accepts the existence of atoms, but asserts that the gathered atoms in their gross form is the object-support. Then, the theory of the object-support as advocated by the Sarvāstivāda is refuted from the standpoint of the Sautrāntika, as Śrīlāta had done, who accepts the existence of atoms, but asserts that the agglomerate of atoms in its gross form is the object-support. And finally, all the theories of the object-support advocated by the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika are refuted from the standpoint of the Yogācāra, who does not accept any external thing as being the object-support, as Vasubandhu and Digāna had done, for instance, in the VŚ and the ĀP.⁵⁰

II-10. According to Jinendrabuddhi in his conclusion to this section, Dignāga's answer to the question about the meaning of the object-support (*ālambanārtha*) asked at the beginning of the section was already given in PS 1.5cd, namely: "The visible matter that is self-

⁴⁹ PST 91,2–6: *tasmāt sāmānyenaiva bāhyārthāśrayiṇī pramāṇādivyavasthā na ghaṭata iti pratipādanaparo 'yam ārambha iti veditavyam. tatrāpi bāhyārthavādiṣu balinaḥ svayūthyāḥ. teṣu nihateṣv itare nihatā eva bhavanti, jyeṣṭhamalla iva nihate tadanye mallā iti tāir eva saha vicāraṃ karoti.*

⁵⁰ Cf. also the analysis in Mimaki 1972: 88.

cognizable and inexpressible is the operation-sphere of the sense faculty.”⁵¹ This is also the same as that which is stated in ĀP 6, where, employing the Yogācāra's idea of the “image-part” of cognition,⁵² he states that only the internal cognizable form (*antarjñeyarūpa*) that appears as if externally is the object of cognition, for the reason that it has the form of this cognition and it is its cause.⁵³

Thus, in following Jinendrabuddhi, it is quite clear that Dignāga is an *Antarjñeyavādin*, advocating the doctrine that accepts only the internal object, without, however, committing himself to the existence of external things, holding only that external things are not the object of cognition. As we shall see below Jinendrabuddhi mentions again this distinction between the *Antarjñeyavāda* and the *Bāhyārthavāda* in another context.⁵⁴ This special term, *antarjñeyavāda*, is thus used by Jinendrabuddhi only in the epistemological sense, and therefore is a proper designation of the epistemological theories advocated by the special group of the Yogācāras which I shall discuss in more detail in the following pages.⁵⁵

II-11. To sum up, Dignāga holds perception to take *sāmānya* as its object-field, because perception is produced by many atoms. This

⁵¹ PST 90,12–91,4: *ye hi manyante – vādaividhidūṣaṇapara evāyam ārambha iti, tesām yad uktam – svasaṃvedyaṃ tv anirdeśyaṃ rūpam indriyagocara ity atra gocārārtho vaktavyaḥ. kiṃ yadābhāsaṃ tatra jñānam utpadyate tathā tad gocara ityādi tulyaḥ paryanuyoga iti pratividheyaṃ.*

⁵² Cf. MS 2.11 (p. 29,8–12): *de ltar rnam par rig pa 'di dag thams cad ni don med pas de tsam yin la | mig la sogs pa'i rnam par rig pa dag ni gzugs la sogs pa rgyu mtshan yin pa dang | de dag gi rnam par shes pa lta ba yin pa nas lus kyi rnam par shes pa lta ba yin pa'i bar gyis rgyu mtshan dang lta ba dang bcas pa'o ||* “Thus, all these representations are merely themselves (*tanmātra*), for they lack objects. The visual representation, etc. (*cakṣurādivijñapti*), has visible matter, etc., as its image[-part] (*nimitta[-bhāga]*), and the awareness of these [visible matter, etc.] as the perceiving[-part] (*darśana[-bhāga]*), up to having [the tangible object as its image[-part] and the awareness of the tactile representation as its perceiving[-part]]. Thus it has the image[-part] and the perceiving[-part].”

⁵³ ĀP 6 (quoted in TSP 582,11–12): *yad antarjñeyarūpaṃ tu bahirvad avabhāstate | so 'rtho jñānarūpatvāt tatpratrayatayāpi ca ||*

⁵⁴ Cf. n. 104.

⁵⁵ Cf. III-3 and V-3.

sāmānya, I repeat,⁵⁶ is interpreted by Jinendrabuddhi as “common property,” i.e. all atoms have the capacity of the producing cognition, that is to say, all atoms are active in generating the cognition, they are the cause of the cognition. This seems to be similar to the Sarvāstivāda-theory. Manorathanandin on the other hand interprets this *sāmānya* as “an agglomerate, or a kind of collection of atoms,” i.e., all atoms agglomerated as a whole. This is probably the Sautrāntika-theory. To be sure, if this *sāmānya* is understood in the sense of an external object, it is similar to the theory rejected by Dignāga himself, and thus, of course, Dignāga is involved in a contradiction. However, if we understand Dignāga as making this statement from the viewpoint of Antarjñeyavāda, the *sāmānya* made up of many atoms no matter what it may be, is thus a reflection of awareness as external many individual atoms or many atoms as a whole, which becomes the cognition sphere (*āyatana*) that is unreal. In this case he is not involved in a contradiction and his theory is consistent.

III. *āyatana*

III-1. In the AKBh, *āyatana* is “etymologically” explained as having the meaning of the *āyadvāra*, “the gate of approaching [the mind and mind-associates],” and *dhātu* as having the meaning of *gotra*, “genus,” which is further glossed as *ākara*, “origin” or “sources.”⁵⁷ According to Saṅghabhadra, the Sautrāntika holds *āyanata* to not really exist; only the *dhātu* is real existence. Saṅghabhadra himself on the other hand, as an advocator of Sarvāstivāda, has the opposite opinion, and in his NA criticizes the former at length. The Sautrāntika’s opinion that the *āyatana* is not real is derived from its position

⁵⁶ Cf. n. 11 and n. 14.

⁵⁷ Cf. AKBh 13,19–21: *yathāikasmin parvate bahūny ayastāmrarūpyasavarṇādīgotrāṇi dhātava ucyaṅte. evaṃ ekasminn āśraye santāne vā aṣṭādaśa gotrāṇi aṣṭādaśa dhātava ucyaṅte. ākarās tatra gotrāṇy ucyaṅte.* “Just like in a mountain there are many genera [of elements] such as iron, copper, silver and gold, which are called elements, in the same way, in a single basis [of personal existence, i.e. the body, = *ātmabhāva*] or a [single] continuum, there are eighteen genera [of elements], which are called the eighteen [psycho-physical] constituent elements (*dhātu*), here the origins (*ākara* = *’byung gnas* = 生本) are called genera.” Cf. also Dhammajoti 2004a: 20.

that the basis and the object-support of the five groups of awareness are not real. As we have seen above, the argument that only the agglomerate (*he-he*) of many atoms can constitute the basis and object-support is concluded by stating that “the *āyatana* is unreal, only the *dhātu* is real.”⁵⁸ Here the *āyatana*, the cognition sphere, includes the five sense faculties that are the basis (*āśraya*) of cognition and the five object-fields that are the object-support (*ālambana*) of cognition. Actually, the Dārṣṭāntikas already held the opinion that cognition can take the non-existent as its object-support,⁵⁹ just like cognitions that take magic creations, Gandarva-city, fire-brand, mirages, etc. (*māyāgandharvanagarālātamṛgatṛṣṇādivat*), as their object-support. The Vaibhāṣika, in contrast, holds that all cognitions take only existent object-references as their object-support.⁶⁰ Following the Dārṣṭāntika tradition, the Sautrāntika maintains that even when a cognition arises from the non-existent, the two [requisite conditions, i.e., *ālambana* and *āśraya*] are still determined (**niścita*) by the reasoning through which the causality [between cognition and its conditions] is mutually inferred.⁶¹ The cognition sphere is unreal because the agglomerate of atoms that constitutes this cognition sphere is only conventional reality, since when the agglomerate is analyzed into its pieces, according to the Sautrāntika's theory of two realities, there is no cognition of this agglomerate.⁶²

III-2. The idea that the cognition sphere is not real is repeatedly criticized by Saṅghabhadra in his NA. He says that if the Sthavira maintains that the *āyatana* is unreal and the *dhātu* is real, his statement violates the utterances in the Sūtras. He quotes some passages from the Sūtras, one of which is also quoted in the AKBh and AKV, to the

⁵⁸ Cf. n. 33.

⁵⁹ Cf. Cox 1988: 43ff.

⁶⁰ MVBh 228b21–24: 謂或有執。有緣無智如譬喻者。彼作是說。若緣幻事健達縛城及旋火輪鹿愛等智皆緣無境。為遮彼執顯一切智皆緣有境。

⁶¹ NA 628c4–5: 智緣非有。亦二決定。推尋因果展轉理故。

⁶² Cf. AKBh 6.4: *yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat / ghaṭāmbuvat samvṛtīsat paramārthasad anyathā* // Cf. also AKBh (*ad loc.*) 334,1–7. This theory is reported by Saṅghabhadra in his ASP 666a9–27.

effect that the phrase “all things” mentioned by the Blessed One (*bhagavat*) refers to the twelve *āyatanas*.⁶³ Moreover, he says, the Blessed One would not say something is ultimately real if it were unreal, and also, one would not accomplish perfect Buddhahood (**samyaksambuddha*) if one were only aware of unreal things. Only the nihilist (**khaṇuṣṣavādin*) would make this kind of statement, not those who respect the Buddha as their teacher.⁶⁴ His conclusion is as follows:

Therefore, all twelve *āyatanas* are real existents. One cannot talk about the ultimate reality with respect to unreal things. Thus, in the statements of Sthavira many contradictions are found between that which was said earlier and that which was said later (**pūrvottaravacanavyāghāta*). Those who have faith without insight respect him; however, those who have both faith and insight would certainly not follow him. And the simile of the many blind persons⁶⁵ is also contradictory to his doctrine. The theory that each atom cannot possess the nature of being the basis and object-support, and the agglomerate of atoms (眾微和合) can be the basis and object-support does not conform to the simile of blind persons at all. The theory that the gathered atoms (和集極微) are the basis and object-support is not contradictory to the simile of blind persons, because it holds that each atom is the basis and object-support. If it is held [by you Sautrāntika] that each atom is invisible, then the agglomerate of atoms would also be invisible, because it is just like what is said in the simile of the blind persons – it is the same as in the state of not being agglomerated (和合: 色合?). Therefore, the five groups of sensory awareness definitely do not take the agglomerate as their object. However, there must be an object, and thus, it is established that they take real things as their object.⁶⁶

⁶³ Cf. AKBh 301,8: *sarvaṃ astīti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva dvādaśāyatanāni*. AKV 5,28–29: *sarvaṃ sarvaṃ iti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva dvādaśāyatanānī sūtre vacanāt*.

⁶⁴ NA 352a5–12: 又若處假界是勝義。上座此論便違經說。如契經說。番答摩尊餘處說言。我覺一切。依何一切言我覺耶。唯願為開勝義有法。世尊告曰。梵志當知。言一切者。謂十二處。此勝義有。餘皆虛偽。世尊不應依不實法說勝義有。又亦不應唯證假有成等正覺。空花論者可說此言。稱佛為師。不應黨此。

⁶⁵ Cf. n. 33.

⁶⁶ NA 352a12–21: 故十二處皆是實有。非於假法可說勝義。如是上座諸有所言。前後諦觀。多成違害。信而無智。同所敬承。具智信人。必無隨順。又眾盲喻。違彼自宗。一一極微非依緣體。眾微和合成依緣論。彼對盲喻。極不相符。和集極微為依緣論。此

The key-point of the difference between the Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda is the following: For the Sautrāntika the agglomerate consisting of many atoms is the basis and object-support, i.e., the *āyatana*, but it is not the real existent, because it can be analyzed into the individual atoms, whereas for the Sarvāstivāda, each atom is the basis and object-support, i.e., the *āyatana*, and they are the real existent, and furthermore, when many atoms are gathered together they are visible.

III-3. The Sautrāntika's idea that the cognition spheres are unreal conforms to Dignāga's consistent thought quite well. When discussing the sources of our knowledge, he prefers to use negative formulations. Formulas such as "P is not/is free of Q," and "Q₁, Q₂, etc., are not P," are used in his definition of perception in PS 1.3cd (*pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham nāmajātyādiyojanā //*). Also in his earlier work, the **Hastavālaprakaraṇa*,⁶⁷ basing himself on the famous snake-rope-hemp simile in MS 3.8,⁶⁸ he states that all phenomena which are examined according to their own nature (**svarūpa*) are the operation-spheres of conventional cognition (*kun rdzob shes pa'i spyod yul*, **samvṛtijñānagocara*); even the partless infinitesimal particle, the atom, does not really exist, for such particles are not able to be the object-support owing to their ungraspable nature, just like sky-flowers, hare-horns, etc.⁶⁹ That which cannot be perceived cannot be held as an existent object of cognition; since the object does not really exist, a cognition of this object must also be errone-

對盲喻理不相違。許一一微是依緣故。執一一微非可見者。眾微和合亦應不見。同盲喻故。如非色合。故五識身。決定不用和合為境。然必有境。故以實法為境義成。

⁶⁷ Cf. the critical edition of the Tibetan translation in Frauwallner 1959: 153–156; a Japanese translation and Sanskrit reconstruction are found in Harada 1993. There is also an early edition and English translation, see Thomas & Ui 1918.

⁶⁸ Cf. MS 3.8. (p. 52,12–16): *mun khung na sbrul du snang ba'i thag pa bzhin du 'jug ste / dper na med pa'i phyir thag pa la sbrul ni nor ba ste / de'i don rtogs pa rnams ni med pa la sbrul gyi blo ldog cing / thag pa'i blor gnas so // de yang rnam par phra mor bya na nor ba ste / kha dog dang / dri dang ro dang reg bya'i mtsan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro //* Cf. Nagao 1991: 67ff.

⁶⁹ Cf. HVP *kārikā* 3ab (154,13–14): *cha med brtag par bya min phyir / tha ma yang ni med par mtshung /* and the prose that follows.

ous. Also in another earlier work, the **Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa*,⁷⁰ he denies the existence of an object of cognition in the same way. There, in opposition to the extremist ideas of sameness (一性, **ekatva*), separateness (異性, **prthaktva*) and non-existence (非有, **asattva*), he explains that the Buddha designates things merely according to conditioned labels (取因假設, **upādāyaprajñapti*). Thus, phenomena exist nominally: they appear either as a conglomerate (總聚, **saṅghāta*, or similar expression), i.e., as the conceptually constructed unity of spatial manifoldness; or as a continuum (相續, **santāna*), i.e., as the conceptually constructed unity of temporal manifoldness; or again as a special condition (分位差別, **avasthāviśeṣa*), i.e. either as a particular component in the conglomerate or a particular stage of the continuum. The conclusion is that phenomena in all three forms exist merely nominally and thus do not really exist. Such concepts are found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. As has been demonstrated by Schmithausen, in this chapter we can find a nominalist philosophy according to which all things ultimately are merely a “Setzung der Sprache,” or, as is said at another point in the same text, that all objective appearances have their root in a conceptual construction (*vikalpa*). According to Schmithausen, this kind of theory is a special form of Mahāyānist illusionism and is a preliminary stage of Yogācāra idealism.⁷¹ I believe that this kind of theory, as a special branch of the Yogācāra system, is the basis of Dignāga’s thought, and that he fully developed it in his last work, the PS(V).⁷²

III-4. The link between Dignāga’s concept of *āyatana* and that of Vasubandhu is very clear. As mentioned above, the background of

⁷⁰ Cf. Frauwallner 1959: 83–164 (on this treatise: 121); Ui 1958, 167–232; Kitagawa 1957: 126–137.

⁷¹ Cf. Schmithausen 1973: 166f.

⁷² Also with regard to another part of the *āyanata*, “the basis,” i.e. the sense faculties, Dignāga accepts the basic idea of the Sautrāntika’s position. In the ĀPV he maintains: “The sense faculty is inferred from its effect [i.e., from cognition] as something the nature of which is power, not as [something material] that is constituted by elements (*bhautika*)” (ĀPV 179,5–6: *dbang po ni rang gi ’bras bu las nus pa’i no bo ñid du rjes su dpag gi ’byung ba las gyur pa ñid du ni ma yin no* //)

Dignāga's discussion on this problem is a passage found in the AKBh.⁷³ According to Yaśomitra's commentary, "the particular of the cognition sphere" refers to "the condition of being cognizable by visual awareness, etc., or[, put in other words,] the condition of being the cognition sphere such as visible matter, etc.;"⁷⁴ Jinendra-buddhi and Vibhūti also say that this is "the condition of being graspable by visual awareness" (*caḥsurvijñānagrāhyatvādi*).⁷⁵ This cognizable or graspable object is simply that which we perceive. Thus, it is said that cognition arises in respect to the particular of this cognizable or graspable object, not in respect to the particular of substance, which, according to Yaśomitra, refers to homogenous substances, such as the color blue.⁷⁶ In this case, a mental generalization takes place and consequently the object of the cognition is no longer the particular, but the universal. The conclusion is that a cognition which arises with respect to the cognition's appearance, namely, with respect to self-awareness, is perception; a cognition that arises with respect to the thing itself, namely, with respect to the atoms or substances, is a conceptual construction. Actually, Dignāga also says that even a mental construction (*kalpanā*) is perception insofar as it perceives itself with respect to self-awareness, but it is not perception with respect to the thing itself (*artha*), because in that case it conceptualizes its object.⁷⁷

III-5. Thus, for the Vaibhāṣika the *āyatana* is the atoms, which are ultimately real, but for both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra this *āyatana*, i.e. that which we perceive, is not real. The question arises: if it is not real, where does it come from? As far as I can see, this question is not answered by the Sautrāntika, and this is the weak

⁷³ Cf. n. 15.

⁷⁴ Cf. AKV 30,15–16: *āyatanānām svalakṣaṇam āyatanasvalakṣaṇam, caḥsurvijñānāvijñeyatvādi rūpāyatanatvādi vā*.

⁷⁵ Cf. PST 44,6 and PVV 176, n.4 (Vibhū).

⁷⁶ Cf. AKV 30,16–17: *dravyānām nīlādīkānām svalakṣaṇam nīlādyākāracāḥsurvijñānāvijñeyatvam, nīlākārādi vā*.

⁷⁷ Cf. PS(V) 1.3,12–13: *yadi rāgādīsvaṣaṃvittiḥ pratyakṣam, kalpanājñānam api nāma. satyam etat. kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt* / (1,7ab)

point of their theory, a point open to attack by the Vaibhāṣika or other opponents. In this regard, the Yogācāra goes further, offering a clear answer, namely, that it is a mental product. Vasubandhu, the Kośakāra,⁷⁸ says in the VŚ(V) that a cognition bearing the appearance of visible matter (*rūpa*) comes forth on account of its own seed, and these two, i.e., the seed, or the visual sense, and the visible matter, are said to be the cognition's two kinds of cognition sphere.⁷⁹ In other words, only those things whose appearance the cognition bears while arising are the cognition spheres, i.e., the visible matter, etc. This is also as Dignāga sees it. Based on the Yogācāra's common ground with the Sautrāntika, the object of sensory cognition is reduced to the "cognizable" or "graspable" of the visual awareness. Thus, the object of cognition is dependent on the cognition itself, and only an object of this nature is its cognition sphere. That is to say, what a cognition cognizes is sense data, not an independent substance. This idea is clearly stated in PS 1.5cd. There, Dignāga concludes that visible matter that is self-cognizable (*svasaṃvedya*) and inexpressible is the operation-sphere (*gocara*) of the senses.⁸⁰ This half-verse is repeated in PSV ad PS 1.41ab, where Dignāga states:

The object-reference of the senses that, although possessing manifold properties,⁸¹ appears to the senses in its particular character, is the cause of the arising of the cognition bearing its appearance. As a part of the cogni-

⁷⁸ I follow Schmithausen 1967: 136 in holding Vasubandhu, the author of the AK(Bh), is also the author of the VŚ and Triṃś; this is accepted in Frauwallner 1994: 425. The latter earlier proposed the theory that there were two persons bearing the name Vasubandhu (Frauwallner 1951), Vasubandhu the younger who was the author of the AK(Bh), and Vasubandhu the elder, the brother of Asaṅga, the Mahāyānist; Frauwallner did not, however make a decision about which of the two authored the VŚ and Triṃś (cf. *ibid.* 56). Cf. Franco 1997: 77, n. 27; Kritzer 2005: xxiv–xxvi.

⁷⁹ VŚ(V) 9 (5,25–6,1): *yataḥ svabījād vijñaptir yadābhāsā pravartate / dividhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravīt //* (9) *kim uktaṃ bhavati. rūpapratibhāsā vijñaptir yataḥ svabījāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaprāptād utpadyate, tac ca bījaṃ yatpratibhāsā ca sā te tasyā vijñaptreṣ caṣṣūrūpāyatanatvena yathākramaṃ bhagavān abravīt.*

⁸⁰ PS 1.5cd: *svasaṃvedyam hy anirdeśyaṃ rūpaṃ indriyagocaraḥ //* = NMukh 16cd: 唯內證離言，是色根境界。 Cf. n. 51.

⁸¹ Cf. PS 1.5ab: *dharmiṇo 'nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatih /*

tion,⁸² it is exclusively individually self-cognizable; and owing to its nature [as individually self-cognizable] it is inexpressible, since an expressible thing is the object that consists in the universal.⁸³

The “self-cognizable,” according to Jinendrabuddhi, refers to something that is not cognized through communication, i.e., is of an internal nature.⁸⁴ Here it is quite clear that, based upon Yogācāra’s common grounds with the Sautrāntika, Dignāga says that the “particular” refers to the cognition sphere that depends on sensory awareness; further, as a Yogācāra, he says that this “particular” is the self-cognizable, a part of the cognition, and thus, what the cognition cognizes is the cognition itself. However, I do not suggest that Dignāga went as far as those Yogācāras who belong to the fully-developed idealist branch of Yogācāra, according to whom the sense faculty and the object-support such as visible matter are the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of storehouse-awareness.⁸⁵

IV. *ākāra*

IV-1. Another interesting point that demonstrates Dignāga’s position on the nature of the object of cognition is his treatment of the so-called “aspect” (*ākāra*), a term used in the Sautrāntika system to

⁸² This translation, following Steinkellner’s reconstruction, is based on Vasudhara-rakṣita’s translation: *shes pa’i rang gi cha shas bzhin du*. Kanakavarman’s translation deviates from this: *shes pa’i rang gi bdag nyid bzhin du*. This possibly can be reconstructed as *jñānasvātmavat*, “the cognition itself.”

⁸³ PSV ad PS 1.41ab: *anekadharmo ‘pīndriyārtho yo ‘sādhāraṇenātmanendriye ‘vabhāsamānaḥ svabhāsa-jñānotpattihetuḥ, sa pratyātmavedya eva jñānasvāmśavat. sa tad-ātmanāśakyanirdeśaḥ, nirdeśyasya sāmānyaviśayatvāt* (reconstructed by Steinkellner, *avabhāsamānas tadābhāsa-jñānotpattihetuḥ* is changed to *°mānaḥ svabhāsa°*, according to the suggestion kindly given by Eli Franco, which is also accepted by Steinkellner per e-mail).

⁸⁴ PST 47, 6–7: *svasaṃvedyam anāgamikam*.

⁸⁵ For example, cf. TrBh 16,2–4: *tatra ātmādivikalpavāsanāpariṇāmad rūpādivikalpavāsanāpariṇāmad ca ālayavijñānād ātmādivikalpavāsanāpariṇāmad rūpādivikalpavāsanāpariṇāmad ca utpadyate*. “With regard to this [*pariṇāma* or transformation], owing to the complete development of the latent psychological impression (*vāsanā*) of the conceptual construction of ‘self,’ etc., owing to the complete development of the psychological impression of the conceptual construction of ‘the visible matter,’ etc., the conceptual construction with its manifestation as ‘self,’ etc. and as visible matter, etc., arises from the storehouse-awareness.”

refer to something that connects a cognizing subject with the cognized object. Dignāga does not reject the Sautrāntika's presupposition, but he develops upon it, coming to the conclusion that an object of cognition must be internal, since the Sautrāntika also maintains that the object of a cognition can only be cognized by means of the fact that the cognition has an aspect (*ākāra*) as its medium to grasp the object. The basis of this kind of development may be the fact, I would like to suggest, that for this special branch of Yogācāra system (vide supra III-3) the state of being existent or non-existent is not an ontological assertion, but rather a phenomenological description of what has been experienced by awareness; thus, the essential point of the discussion is whether an experience is obtained internally or externally, not whether a perceived object really exists externally or not.

IV-2. In holding this, Dignāga would not be involved in a doctrinal conflict with the Sautrāntika, because such a viewpoint is, to some extent, actually also shared by the Sautrāntika. For the Sautrāntika, an object is not directly perceivable, there is no direct connection between an object and its subject, and cognition is produced only through this (the object's) "aspect." According to Mokṣākaragupta, this is the Sautrāntika's tenet:

The Sautrāntika maintains: everything that appears in the form of something blue, etc., is nothing but the cognition [itself], not the external object, because an insentient thing is not able to illuminate [itself to the cognition]. [This is] just as it is said that the visible [objects] that produce the cognition in their own aspects are not the operation-spheres of sense faculties (*indriyagocara*).⁸⁶

This intermediate thing, the "aspect" (*ākāra*), also called "appearance" (or *ābhāsa*, *pratibhāsa*, or expressed in the verb form *prati-√bhās*, "to appear," etc.), must be the productive cause of internal cognition, and this is cognition itself, i.e., self-awareness. In contrast,

⁸⁶ TBh 63,17–20: *sautrāntikānām matam – jñānam evedaṃ sarvaṃ nīlādyākāreṇa pratibhāsate, na bāhyo 'rthaḥ, jaḍasya prakāśayogāt. yathoktam – svākārajñānanajakā dṛśyā nendriyagocarāḥ iti.*

the external object, insofar as being independent of cognition since it is insentient, cannot be perceived directly.

IV-3. The Sautrāntika defines this *ākāra* as “a specific way (*prakāra*) in which all minds and mind-associates grasp the object-support.”⁸⁷ It is also mentioned that the mind and mind-associates are accompanied by an object-support (*sālabana*), because they grasp their object-field; and they have an aspect (*sākāra*) of the object, because precisely this object-support gives its aspect to the mind and mind-associates in this specific way (*prakāra*).⁸⁸ Put in other words, the mind and mind-associates never come forth without an object-support, and the object-support appears in the mind and mind-associates only in a special way, i.e., through an aspect that presents the particular character of the object-support. This idea is explained in the AKV as follows:

The reason why these [mind and mind-associates] **are accompanied by an object-support** is that precisely this object-support is grasped in a specific way. How? For an awareness is aware of a blue or yellow thing, it perceives it [in this way] – this is the meaning; a sensation experiences precisely this thing as its object-support as such [i.e., as blue or yellow]; the ideation determines [this thing in that way], and the intention (*cetanā*) forms [a volition about this thing in that way], and other [cognitions] work the same way.⁸⁹

That is to say, without this “aspect” the object-support cannot be perceived in its specific way; the distinct visible form of an object is made known only by virtue of this “aspect,” because an object itself in its real form, i.e., in the form of atoms, as the real cause of a cognition, does not present a distinct form. Thus, this “aspect,” though reflecting a thing that is not really existent, not the real cause

⁸⁷ Cf. AKBh 401,20–21: *evaṃ tu yuktaṃ syāt – sarveṣāṃ cittacaittānām ālambanagrahaṇaparakāra ākāra iti*. Yaśomitra identifies this as Sautrāntika opinion (AKV 830, 32: *evaṃ tu yuktaṃ syād iti sautrāntikamatam*). Cf. Kritzer 2005: 374.

⁸⁸ Cf. AKBh 62,5–6: *ta eva hi cittacaittāḥ... sālabanā viṣayagrahaṇāt. sākārās tasyaivālabanasya prakāraśa ākāraṇāt*.

⁸⁹ AKV 165,17–21: *yena te sālabanāḥ tasyaivālabanasya prakāreṇa grahaṇāt. katham. vijñānaṃ hi nīlaṃ pītaṃ vā vastu vijñānāti, upalabhata ity arthaḥ. tad eva tathālabanaṃ vastu vedanānubhavati. sañjñā paricchinatti. cetanābhisamśkarotīty evam ādi*.

of cognition, is the only indispensable link between the object and subject.

IV-4. When discussing, in PS(V) 1.8cd ff., the identity of the means of cognition with its result, Dignāga asserts that self-awareness is the result. In doing so, he very clearly presents his Yogācāra position with regard to the problem of the object of cognition. Although he bases his idea evidently on Yogācāra concepts, he tries to make the Sautrāntika's position fit his Yogācāra understanding of the object of cognition.⁹⁰ A complete translation of this section is found in Hattori 1968: 28ff. In the following, I will briefly paraphrase those points of this section that concern our topic, and introduce some relevant interpretations of Jinendrabuddhi. In some places I deviate from Hattori.

IV-5. In PS(V) 1.8cd-9a Dignāga states that his position is different from that of those who maintain that an object of cognition exists externally, since for him the means of cognition is the result. And this result, i.e., the cognition, is apprehended as accompanied by an act of cognizing, for it arises with the aspect of an object-field (*viṣayākāra*), and thus, although without action, it is metaphorically called a means of cognition.⁹¹ Or more precisely, Dignāga rephrases,

⁹⁰ Cf. Iwata 1991 I: 1–4, where the different doctrinal backgrounds of Sautrāntika and Yogācāra of each statement in PS 1.8ab–9cd are analysed.

⁹¹ As Tosaki pointed out (1979: 44), this Sautrāntika idea has its origin in Vasubandhu's AKBh 473,25–474,2: *yat tarhi vijñānaṃ vijñānānti sūtra uktam, kiṃ tatra vijñānaṃ karoti. na kiñcit karoti. yathā tu kāryaṃ kāraṇam anuvidhīyata ity ucyate sādṛśyenātmalābhād akurvad api kiñcit, evaṃ vijñānaṃ api vijñāntīty ucyate sādṛśyenātmalābhād akurvad api kiñcit. kiṃ punar asya sādṛśyam. tadākāratā. ata eva tad indriyād apy utpannaṃ viṣayaṃ vijñāntīty ucyate nendriyam.* “Then, as to what is said in the Sūtra that awareness is aware [of an object], what does awareness do in that case? It does nothing. However, just as it is said that an effect always conforms to the cause, on account of it acquiring its existence by being similar [to the cause], although it does nothing whatsoever, in the same way, it is also said that an awareness is aware [of an object] owing to the fact that it acquires its existence [from the object] by being similar [to it], although [the awareness] does nothing whatsoever. Now, what is its similarity? It is the fact that it has the aspect of that [object]. Precisely for this reason, although it is also produced by the sense faculties, it is said that [the awareness] is aware of the object and not of the sense faculties.” (Cf. the translations in Cox 1988: 39 and in Dhammajoti 2004: 90f.)

self-awareness is the result. Cognition arises with two appearances: the appearance of the cognition itself and the appearance of the object-field. A self-awareness of these two appearances is the result.⁹² Jinendrabuddhi adds here: “Regardless of whether there is an external object or not, the cognition is cognized as bearing both appearances.”⁹³

IV-6. In the next passage Dignāga offers two interpretations that are based on the Yogācāra system and the Sautrāntika system, respectively. He explains in PS 1.9b that the reason for an awareness being the result is that a determination of an object-reference, i.e., the cognition of an object-reference, has the nature of that awareness (*tadrūpa*).⁹⁴ This can be interpreted in two different ways. First, according to the Yogācāra-system, which does not accept external objects, a cognition that is accompanied by [the aspect] of its object-field (*saviṣayaṃ jñānam*) is the object-reference, and thus the object-reference is apprehended as being pleasant or unpleasant according to the form of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedanānurūpam artham*).⁹⁵ And secondly, according to the Sautrāntika-system, a system originating in the Sarvāstivāda, which accepts external objects, the external object-reference is a cognizable object, and thus the cognition's simply possessing the appearance of the object-field (*viṣayābhāsataiva*) is the means of cognition.⁹⁶ Dignāga emphasizes that although an object-reference as the proper form of cognition (*sva-*

⁹² PS(V) 1.8c–9a: *atra ca savyāpārapratītatvāt pramāṇaṃ phalam eva sat.* (8cd) *na hy atra bāhyakānām iva pramāṇād arthāntaraṃ phalam. tasyaiva tu phalabhūtasya jñānasya viṣayākārataḥ utpattya savyāpārapratītiḥ. tām upādāya pramāṇatvam upacaryate nirvyāpāram api sat. svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra* (9a) *dvyābhāsaṃ hi jñānam utpadyate svābhāsaṃ viṣayābhāsaṃ ca. tasyobhayābhāsasya yat svasaṃvedanaṃ tat phalam.*

⁹³ PST 69,13–14: *saty asati vā bāhye 'rtha ubhayābhāsaṃ jñānaṃ saṃvedyate.*

⁹⁴ PS 1.9b: *tadrūpo hy arthaniscayaḥ /*

⁹⁵ Cf. PSV ad PS 1.9b: *yadā hi saviṣayaṃ jñānam arthaḥ, tadā svasaṃvedanānurūpam artham pratipadyata iṣṭam anīṣṭaṃ vā.*

⁹⁶ Cf. PS(V) 1.9c–d1: *yadā tu bāhya evārthaḥ prameyaḥ, tadā viṣayābhāsataivāsya pramāṇam.*

rūpam)⁹⁷ is the self-cognizable within the cognition, nevertheless under the Sautrāntika's ontological presupposition mentioned above, that the object-reference exists externally, this point is disregarded in order to avoid a doctrinal conflict with the Sautrāntika-system; thus, by seeking common ground by putting aside differences, both systems may agree on the point that the object-reference is cognized simply through the cognition's possessing the appearance of the object.⁹⁸ With regard to this point, Jinendrabuddhi states:

Even though at any time [the object-reference as] the **proper form** [of cognition] is the self-cognizable [of the cognition], nevertheless, **irrespective** of this [nature, we say that] **only** the cognition's **bearing the appearance** of its object-field in respect to the external cognizable **is the means of cognition**, not its bearing the appearance of [the cognition] itself, because this [bearing the appearance of itself] is unacceptable as producing [the cognition] (*sādhana**tva*) with respect to an external object, and it is unacceptable because it takes another thing [i.e. the internal aspect] as its object. For insofar as the aspect of the grasping subject takes itself to be the object-field, how could it be the means of cognition with respect to the external thing? Indeed it is not possible to be means of cognition (*prāmāṇya*) for one thing with the object-field in another thing.⁹⁹

Thus, it is quite clear that under the Sautrāntika's ontological presupposition it must be said that a cognition bears the aspect of an external object, not the internal aspect of the cognition. Dignāga's purpose of stating this, I believe, is to show that even under the Sautrāntika's presupposition, it is still valid to say that a cognition cognizes its object by means of an aspect and not directly.

⁹⁷ This "proper form of cognition" is regarded as "the grasped part of cognition," for instance, Vinitadeva paraphrases the phrase *viññānasvarūpe* in TrBh 16,8 as *mam pa shes pa'i gzung ba'i cha* (TrT 7b1). Cf. n. 17 and *jñānasvāṃśa* in n. 83.

⁹⁸ Cf. PSV ad PS 1.9c-d; *tadā hi jñānasvasaṃvedyam api svarūpam anapekṣyārthābhāsataivāsya pramāṇam*.

⁹⁹ PST 72,6-9: *yady api sarvakālaṃ svasaṃvedyam asti svarūpam, tathāpi tad anapekṣya jñānasya bāhye prameye viṣayābhāsataiva pramāṇam, na svābhāsatā, bāhye 'rthe tasyāḥ sādhanatvayogāt. ayogas tv aparārthatvāt. grāhakākāro hy āmaviṣayaḥ katham bāhye 'rthe pramāṇaṃ syāt. na hy anyaviṣayasyānyatra prāmāṇyam yuktam*.

IV-7. Dignāga continues: “the object-field is cognized as this or that form, exactly according to the way in which the aspect of the object (*arthākāra*) appears in the cognition, as being pleasant or unpleasant, etc.”¹⁰⁰ Jinendrabuddhi says straightforwardly that this sentence simply means that “an external object is determined by means of the aspect of the cognizable of the cognition.”¹⁰¹ This “aspect” is, in the ultimate sense, self-awareness. Thus, according to Dignāga’s interpretation, the Sautrāntika’s theory agrees with that of the Yogācāra in any case. To this point Jinendrabuddhi states:

And in this case, just as it is said: “The fire is inferred from the smoke,” but this [fire] is not directly inferred from that [smoke], [but] rather from the cognition of the smoke that is caused by that [smoke], in the same way, even though it is said: “**this object is cognized through that [i.e., through the cognition’s possessing the appearance of the object],**” yet it should be understood as being through self-awareness, which is brought about by that [appearance]. This is to say, **exactly according to the way in which the aspect of object-reference (*arthākāra*) takes its form (*sannivīśate*)**¹⁰² **in the cognition** in the form of **pleasant or unpleasant, etc.**, the self-awareness comes forth (*prathate*); and exactly according to the way in which this [self-awareness] becomes known (*khyāti*), the object is cognized as a pleasant or unpleasant thing, etc. For, if [the cognition possessing] this aspect be produced, it must be the awareness of [the cognition] itself with such an [aspect], and thus on account of this [self-awareness] the object-field should be established, not otherwise. For this reason, **possessing the appearance of the object-field is the means of cognition.**¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ PSV ad PS 1.9d₂: *yathā yathā hy arthākāro jñāne pratibhāti śubhāśubhādītvena, tattadrūpaḥ sa viśayaḥ pramīyate.*

¹⁰¹ PST 72,11: *jñānasya jñeyākāravaśena bāhyo ’rtho niścīyata ity arthaḥ.*

¹⁰² The word *sannivīśate* is used to paraphrase the word *pratibhāti* that is used in the PSV.

¹⁰³ PST 72,11–73,2: *atra ca yathā dhūmenāgnir anumīyata ity ucyate, na cāsau sāḥyāt tenānumīyate, kiṃ tarhi taddhetukena dhūmajñānena, tathā yady api – so ’rthas tena mīyata ity ucyate, tathāpi tatsādhanayā svasaṃvideti veditavyam. tathā hi yathā yathārthākāro jñāne sannivīśate śubhāśubhādirūpeṇa, tathā tathā svasaṃvittīḥ prathate. yathā yathā ca sā khyāti, tathā tathārtho niścīyate śubhāśubhādirūpādīḥ. yadi hi tadākāram utpannaṃ syāt, tadā tādrśasyātmanaḥ saṃvittīḥ syāt. tatas’ ca tadvaśād viśayaniścayo bhavet, nānyathā. tasmād viśayābhāsataḥ pramāṇam.*

That is to say, the object-field of this or that form (*rūpa*) is cognized according to the aspect (*ākāra*) that the cognition possess when it arises, and this results in a self-awareness; it is precisely through this self-awareness that the object is cognized, not through the object-field itself. Thus, this position of the Sautrāntika does not contradict that of the Yogācāra.

IV-8. On the above-mentioned twofold interpretation of the cognizable, Jinendrabuddhi comments:

In this regard, in the tenet of the internal cognizable (*antarjñeyapakṣa*), **accompanied with its object-field** [means accompanied] by an object-field that is characterized as the grasped part [of the cognition], because only in respect to this [grasped part] is the object-field established; in the tenet of external object-reference (*bāhyārthapakṣa*), however, [it means accompanied] by the external [object-field]. Since in [our system of] representation-only, [i.e., in the system of Antarjñeyavāda,] nothing exists that is separate from awareness, it is exclusively the cognition that determines the object-reference to be pleasant when it experiences its own aspect as pleasant. From the opposite [experience, i.e. one that is unpleasant, the object is determined as being] the converse [i.e., unpleasant].¹⁰⁴

Thus, the cognitive aspect is a necessary medium for cognizing an object, and only through this aspect can the cognition be produced. Jinendrabuddhi continues:

In this case, only the aspect of something blue, etc., alone is experienced. This [aspect] must be necessarily accepted as the cognition itself (*viññānasyātmabhūta*), otherwise this [cognition] would have no connection with the object-reference. And a thing (*vastu*) external to or separated from this [cognition], no matter whether with the aspect of this [thing] or without the aspect of this [thing], is never perceived, nor is it possible to be the object-support. How is this impossible? In [the section] “examination of the *Vāda-vidhi*” [i.e., PS(V) 1.13–16] it is explained in which sense it is impossible.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ PST 70,6–10: *tatrāntarjñeyapakṣe grāhyāṃśalakṣaṇena viṣayeṇa saviśayam, tatraiva viṣayavyavasthānāt. bāhyārthapakṣe tu bāhyena. tatra vijñāptimātratāyām vijñānavyati-riktasya vastuno 'bhāvād buddhir eva yadeṣṭaṃ svam ākāram anubhavati, tadeṣṭam arthaṃ niścīnoti, viparyayād viparītam.*

¹⁰⁵ PST 68,4–7: *iha nīlādīyākāra eka evānubhūyate. sa vijñānasyātmabhūto 'vaśyam abhyupeyaḥ. anyathā tasyārthena sambandho na syāt. na ca tasmāt tadākāram atadākāraṃ*

Therefore, according to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga's thought in this regard is consistent: Only the internal cognizable, the so-called "aspect," is the object of cognition, not the external object, because this is not perceived.

IV-9. Jinendrabuddhi's following remark gives the gist of Dignāga's thought in this regard:

Therefore, no cognition (*saṃvitti*) of something other than awareness (*viññāna*) is possible. Rather, only a self-apprehended awareness arises. Thus, only self-awareness is the result. There may be an external object-reference; even so, the object-field is determined exclusively according to [self-]awareness. Therefore, it is only possible for this [self-awareness] to be the result. For it is not the case that the object-reference is experienced according to its independent existence (*svabhāva*), so that according to this [experience] the distinct proper-form [of this object-reference] could be determined, because otherwise the undesired consequence would follow that all [different] cognitions would have the same form. However, the subjective representations (*viññapti*) are of many [different] forms. For instance, it is observed that with respect to a single thing alone, different cognizers acquire their awarenesses with [different] aspects, according to [their mind] being sharp or slow. But a single thing does not have many [different] aspects, because otherwise it must follow that it would not be a single thing.¹⁰⁶

Therefore, in Dignāga's system, regardless of whether the external object exists or not, that which is cognized is the aspect of self-awareness which is the subjective product: either the aspect of the cognition itself as the grasped part of cognition according to Yogācāra, or the aspect of the external object according to Sautrāntika. It is never the external object itself. To this point Jinendrabuddhi states quite decisively:

vā bahir vyatiriktaṃ vastūpalabhyate. na cālambanaṃ ghaṭate. kathaṃ ca na ghaṭate. yathā ca na ghaṭate, tathā vādavidhiparīksāvāṃ vakṣyati.

¹⁰⁶ PST 68,11–69,3: *tasmād na viññānavyatiriktaśya kasyacit saṃvittiḥ sambhavati. viññānam eva tu svasaṃviditam utpadyata iti svasaṃvittir eva phalam. bhavatu nāma bāhyārthaḥ, tathāpi yathāsaṃvedanam eva viśayo niścīyata iti tad eva phalaṃ yuktam. na hi yathāsvabhāvam anubhavo 'rthasya, yato yathāsau vyavasthitasvarūpas tathā śakyeta niścetum, sarvajñānānām ekākāraprasaṅgāt. anekākārās tu viññaptayaḥ. tathā hy ekasminn eva vastuni pratīpatīrbhedena paṭumandatādibhir ākārair anugatāni viññānāny upalabh-yante. na caikaṃ vastv anekākāram, anekatvaprasaṅgāt.*

First, when [the cognition] is free from conceptual construction, the aspect of grasping is the means of cognition, [namely] perception which is free from conceptual construction; the particular, as the aspect of the grasped object with a clear appearance, is the object of cognition.¹⁰⁷

V. Conclusion

V-1. We have mentioned above that Dignāga's theory was falsely interpreted by his opponents as coming from a realistic standpoint, and thus that it contained an internal contradiction. However, as we have discussed, if we understand Dignāga as maintaining that the object is a mental product, an internal aspect of object that appears as externally existent, this problem will disappear. For Dignāga, an object in any combined form of many atoms is not real. Thus he refutes both the Sautrāntika-theory and the Sarvāstivāda-theory. For him, the cognition sphere (*āyatana*) is unreal in any case, as it also is for the Sautrāntika, as reported by Saṅgabhadra. Thus, although the cognition sphere may be analyzed as an agglomerate of atoms as a whole, or as the gathered individual atoms, this is not important for him. From the Yogācāra viewpoint, it is not necessary to make a distinction between the two. For in any case it is clear for him that external existents cannot be the cause of our cognition, since as atoms the cognition cannot bear their appearance, and as an agglomerate of atoms they cannot be real existent, i.e., the real cause. Therefore, the only possible conclusion is that the object of cognition is the internal cognizable, is the grasped part of cognition, is the self-cognizable, and any cognition is self-awareness in nature. He also says that cognition arising with respect to self-awareness is perception; with respect to an object itself, namely outside this self-awareness, it is conceptual construction.¹⁰⁸ Thus, every true cognition can only be self-awareness in its true sense. Therefore, for Dignāga, the *svalakṣaṇa* cannot be an independent external thing, for in that case it would either be unreal or something of which a cognition cannot

¹⁰⁷ PST 74,11–12: *nirvikalpe tāvat grāhakākāraḥ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam, spaṣṭapratibhāso grāhyākāraḥ svalakṣaṇaṃ prameyam ...*

¹⁰⁸ Cf. n. 77.

have an appearance; only as a cognition sphere of cognition, as self-cognizable, or as internally cognizable, can it be a real cause of cognition. In this way, Dignāga's theory of object of cognition presented in PS(V) 1 is consistent.

V-2. Dharmakīrti explains *svalakṣana* along other lines. He explicitly states that the object of a perception is capable of fulfilling a purpose (*arthakriyā*), but an object of inference is not. And the particular and the universal are different: one is capable of fulfilling a purpose and is real in the ultimate sense, the other is real only in a conventional sense.¹⁰⁹ This description of *svalakṣaṇa* is, at least *prima facie*, based on something external. Thus Dharmakīrti is a realist in this regard, although in other parts of PV 3 he presents other views. As expressed by Dunne, Dharmakīrti presents different "scales of analysis," which in some cases represent the viewpoint of the "epistemic idealist."¹¹⁰ This is not the case in Dignāga's work, since for him, as an Antarjñeyavādin, an ultimately real existence, being an existent outside mind, is non-perceivable, since a cognition can not bear its appearance. What can be perceived is only an appearance or an image, it does not exist in its real form, i.e., in the form of atoms. Dignāga expresses his skepticism about external reality being perceivable; the idea of fulfilling a purpose is unknown to him. The difference between Dharmakīrti and Dignāga is clear: Dharmakīrti believes that there is a cognition of certainty based upon an external real existence that can independently fulfill a human being's purpose, and searches for the rules of its cognition. Dignāga is skeptical in this regard. Thus the words such as "non-erroneous"

¹⁰⁹ Cf. PV 3.1a–c: *mānaṃ dvividhaṃ meyvadvividhyāt śaktyaśaktitāḥ / arthakriyāyām;* PV 3.3 *arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat / anyat saṃvṛtīsat proktaṃ te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe //*. And in PVSV 84,3–11: *sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya eva arthakriyākṣamaḥ /* (166ab) *idam eva hi vastvavastunor lakṣaṇaṃ yad arthakriyāyogyatā ayogyatā ca iti vakṣyāmaḥ / sa ca arthakriyāyogyo arthaḥ nānveti yo anveti na tasmāt kāryasambhavaḥ //* (166cd) *tasmāt sarvaṃ sāmānyam anarthakriyāyogyatvād avastu / vastu tu viśeṣa eva tata eva tamiṣpatteḥ /* (Cf. English transl. in Dunne 2004: 80f. n.41.)

¹¹⁰ Cf. Dunne 2004: 53ff, 59.

(*abhrānta*), “fulfilling a purpose,” “trustworthiness” (*avisamvāda*),¹¹¹ etc., can only be found in Dharmakīrti’s vocabulary. Dignāga tells us what is not a real object, whereas Dharmakīrti tells us what real cognition is.¹¹² Because of this difference, Dharmakīrti develops his own complete theory of perception. In the PVin and later in the NB, he adds the new element “non-erroneous” to the definition of perception.¹¹³

V-3. As for the problem of Dignāga’s doctrinal affiliation, I would not like to give decisive conclusion, because the distinction between the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra as two different schools¹¹⁴ is an unsolved problem, at least for me.

In the case of Vasubandhu, by whom Dignāga was undoubtedly strongly influenced, more and more evidence has come to light showing that many “Sautrāntika” theories found in Vasubandhu’s AKBh are similar to those advocated in the Yogācārabhūmi. Some scholars maintain that the former have their origin in the latter, and thus, Vasubandhu was already a Mahāyānist Yogācāra when he composed the AKBh, not changing his doctrinal affiliation from Hināyāna to Mahāyāna.¹¹⁵ However, in a recently published paper

¹¹¹ The word *avisamvāda* was used by Dignāga, but in another context, cf. Chu 2004: 115, n. 12.

¹¹² This characteristic of Dignāga’s thought is also presented in his theory of inference. Hayes has correctly pointed out: “[L]ogic for Dinnāga is not intended to serve as a means of adding to our knowledge but rather as a means of subtracting from our opinions. The criteria of inferential certainty that Dinnāga puts forward are very strict, so strict that very few of our opinions can measure up to them. Whereas Dharmakīrti tended to see this strictness as a weakness in Dinnāga’s logic, since it was in Dinnāga’s system virtually impossible to arrive at any sort of reasonable inductive certainty, I shall argue that the strictness of Dinnāga’s criteria was not oversight on this part but was quite deliberate, for it served his overall skepticism quite well.” (Hayes 1988: 35)

¹¹³ Cf. PVin 1.4ab: *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*; NB 1.4: *tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*.

¹¹⁴ Cf. the discussion on the use of the word “school” in Franco 1997: 90–92.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Kritzer 1999: 20, 204; 2005: xxvii. Since the 1980s, a number of Japanese scholars have been involved in studies on Sautrāntika and have re-examined the information on the history of Sautrāntika contained in Chinese materials. The most important results can be found in Katō 1989; cf. also Kritzer 2003, especially, 218f.

Dhammajoti maintains that “the early Dārṣṭāntika-s and (Sarvāstivādin) Yogācāra-s all belong to the same Sarvāstivāda tradition originally.”¹¹⁶ And based on the assumption of this historical background he says:

Of course, being within the same milieu, the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautāntika and Mahāyānic Yogācāra – particularly those who are praxis-oriented – must have been mutually influenced doctrinally. Accordingly, it should not be surprising to find doctrinal parallels between what Vasubandhu identifies as Sautrāntika doctrine in AKB on the one hand, and some of the doctrines in the *Yogācārabhūmi* on the other hand. This does not necessarily imply that Vasubandhu bases his Sautrāntika doctrines on the *Yogācārabhūmi*.¹¹⁷

Actually, half a century ago Yin shun has already pointed out that in the sectarian period of Buddhism there was no theory of awareness-only in the ontological sense, however the theory of awareness-only without external object in the epistemological sense was already well-developed.¹¹⁸ Thus, it may be safe to say that some Yogācāra theories, especially those in the field of epistemology, are much earlier than the Yogācāra that is generally regarded as a Mahāyānic “school.” The persons who hold special Yogācāra theories may be called “Yogācāra-Sautrāntika” based on the differentiation between the Hīnayāna Sautrāntika and the Mahāyānist Sautrāntika made in the Uighur version of the *Tattvārtha*,¹¹⁹ or “Yogācāra with Sautrāntika presupposition” in following Schmithausen’s influential paper “Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃśatikā und Trimśikā.”¹²⁰ Based on my studies in this paper, I tend to assume that Dignāga’s theory of the object of cognition also belongs to this kind of Yogācāra theories. However, since the nature of these special Yogācāra theories – whether they are Mahāyānic or remain Hīnayānic – has not yet been

¹¹⁶ Dhammajoti 2006: 195

¹¹⁷ Dhammajoti 2006: 195–196.

¹¹⁸ Yin shun 1970: 200.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Dhammajoti 2006: 199.

¹²⁰ Cf. Franco 1997: 94; Schmithausen: 1967. I do not suggest that the difference between this special group of Yogācāras and the rest of Yogācāras is the basis of the division of Yogācāra system into *lung gi rjes 'brang* and *rigs pa'i rjes 'brang* in the later Tibetan *grub mtha'* texts.

clarified, it seems to me too early to make decision with regard to Dignāga's doctrinal affiliation. Thus, in this paper, I would like to let it remain open. Actually, for me to label him as Yogācāra or a Sautrāntika is less important than to understand what his statements about the object of cognition really mean. In any case, one point is clear: Dignāga treats the object of cognition as something inside cognition, and regards its appearance as external thing as unreal. This point is clearly close to the Mahāyānic Yogācāra system, however it is apparently also shared by the Hīnayānic Sautrāntika to a certain extent. Thus, we are not in the position to label Dignāga simply as Yogācāra or Sautrāntika, rather, it seems to me proper to refer him as a “theoretician of an internal object of cognition” (*antarjñeyavādin*), as Jinendrabuddhi did.¹²¹

Abbreviations and literature

I. Primary literature

- AD *Abhidharmadīpa: Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*. Ed. by P. S. Jaini, Patna 1959.
- AKBh *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*. Ed. by P. Pradhan, Patna 1975.
- AKV *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: The Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomittā*. Vol. I-II. Ed. by S. D. Śāstrī, Varanasi 1998.
- ASP **Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā* = 阿毘達磨彰顯宗論, T 1563 (vol. 29T29).
- ĀP *Ālambanaparīkṣā*: in Frauwallner 1930: 176–179.
- ĀPV *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti*: in Frauwallner 1930: 176–179.
- CWSL *Cheng wei shi lun* [成唯識論 = *Vijñānamātrasiddhiśāstra*]: T 1585 (vol. 31).
- CWSLSJ *Cheng wei shi lun su ji* [成唯識論述記]: T 1830 (vol. 43).

¹²¹ Cf. n. 46.

- HVP *Hastavālaprakaraṇa*: in Frauwallner 1959: 153–156.
- MS *Mahāvāyānasaṅgraha*: in É. Lamotte: *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga*, Tome I, Versions tibétaine et chinoise (Hiuan-tsang), Louvain 1973.
- MVBh *Mahāvibhāṣāsāstra* = *A pi da mo da pi po sha lun* [阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論], T 1545 (vol. 27).
- NA **Nyāyānusāra* = *A pi da mo shun zheng li lun* [阿毘達磨順正理論] T 1562 (vol.29).
- NC *Nayacakra: Dvādaśāraṇaṃ Nayacakraṇaṃ of Ācārāya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa with the Commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*. 3 vols. Ed. by Muni Jambūvijayajī, Bhavnagar 1966.
- NB *Nyāyabindu*: in Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's *Dharmottarapradīpa*. [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*]. Ed. by D. Malvania. Patna 21971.
- NMukh *Nyāyamukha* = *Yin-ming zheng li men lun* [因明正理門論]: T 1629 (vol. 32), and in Katsura 1982.
- PST *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, Chapter 1, Part I: Critical Edition. Ed. E. Steinkellner et al., Beijing – Vienna 2005.
- PST^T *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Tibetan translation) = *Yangs ba dang dri ma med pa dang ldan pa zhes bya ba tshad ma kun las btus pa'i 'grel bshad*, Derge ed., Tshad ma, vol. 20, no. 4268, Ye 1b1–314a7.
- PS(V) 1 *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti): Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1, A Hypothetical Reconstruction of the Sanskrit Text with the Help of the Two Tibetan Translations on the Basis of the Hitherto Known Sanskrit Fragments and the Linguistic Materials Gained from Jinendrabuddhi's Ṭīkā*. Ed. Ernst Steinkellner, published at: http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ias/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf.
- PV *Pramāṇavārttika*: in PVV.
- PVP *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi) = *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi dka' 'grel*, TP vol. 130, 5717(b), Che, 1–390a8.
- PVin *Pramāṇaviniścaya: Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapter 1 and 2*. Ed. E. Steinkellner, Beijing – Vienna 2007.
- PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*: R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Pra-*

- māṇavārttika*, with a commentary by Manorathanandin. Patna 1938–1940.
- T *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* [大正新脩大藏經]. Ed. Takakusu Junjirō (高楠順次郎) and Watanabe Kaikyoku (渡邊海旭), Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai 1924–1932.
- TP The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition – Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto. Ed. by Daisetz T. Suzuki, Tokyo-Kyoto 1957.
- TBh *Tarkabhāṣā*: in H.R. Rangaswami Iyengar (ed.), *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda*. Mysore 1952.
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- VŚ *Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*: see TrBh.
- VŚ^T Tibetan translation of VŚ = *Nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa*: in TP 5558 (vol. 113), Si, 4b1–11a1.
- VŚ^C Chinese translation of VŚ = *Wei shi er shi lun*: in T 1590 (vol. 31).
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