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Document Details :
Title: Antwoord aan Bejamin De Mesel
Author(s): FAURE, Gerbert
Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Volume: 80 Issue: 1 Date: 2018
This text is a reply to the critical study by Benjamin De Mesel (cf. previous article). In his discussion of my book, Benjamin de Mesel argues against my view that someone can be held responsible without being responsible. De Mesel believes that it is justified to hold people responsible, because they have free will. Moreover, he intends to show that Peter Strawson holds a similar view. In this reply, I argue that people may have different kinds of free will, but they lack the kind of free will that is necessary to be morally responsible. Next, I argue that Strawson’s concept of the objective attitude implies that free will and moral responsibility are problematic. It is only in this light that Strawson’s naturalistic notion of reactive attitudes becomes meaningful.