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Title: Consciences et inconsciences métaphysiques chez Merleau-Ponty
Author(s): DALISSIER, Michel
Journal: Etudes phénoménologiques - Phenomenological Studies
Volume: 2 Date: 2018
I begin by comparing and contrasting Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysical project with the views of philosophers, such as Wolff, Leibniz, Bergson, Sartre, and Heidegger. Focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s most striking 'metaphysical question', the one about 'bringing into being' (faire-être), I then show how it contrasts with notions such as being, non-being, and 'being-made' (être fait). Responding to three objections to this theory, I, first, show how 'making' (faire) is distinct from 'acting'. Second, I argue that 'bringing into being' is only actualized in 'metaphysical consciousness', when it shifts from wondering before the paradox to realizing that the contradiction can be fruitful. This is a critique of the foundation of metaphysics in Aristotle and Plato. Third, I propose four arguments in order to counter the view that Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysics is just the unthinkable blind spot of his thought. I conclude by showing that his emphasis on consciousness allows us to distinguish three meanings of unconsciousness.