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Document Details :
Title: Getekend door het lichaam
Subtitle: De rol van het lichaam bij de totstandkoming van persoonsidentiteit
Author(s): DE VLEESCHOUWER, Gregory
Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Volume: 72 Issue: 2 Date: 2010
According to Kant, experience is always characterised by a duality: on the one hand, there is the subjective pole of experiences, and on the other hand, an objective world of which the experiences are experience of. In §1 I focus on the objective pole and go into the question (with Kant and Strawson) of what someone assumes about the objective world when he or she experiences it. In §2 I shift the attention towards the subjective pole of this duality: to see itself as distinct from objective reality, the subjective side has to be able to consider itself as a unity — called by Kant ‘ich denke’ or ‘transcendental I’. Kant (defended by Strawson) sees this ich denke as the bodiless core of selfconsciousness (or experience). This seems irreconcilable, though, with the current growing conviction that consciousness cannot be incorporeal: consciousness is always embodied — what I will call corporality. At the end of §3, though, I show that sheer corporality in itself is not enough to form the subjective unity that is needed for experience: a further step is required. But unlike Strawson and Kant, I defend the argument that this second step is not to be considered as the transition of an incorporeal, abstract ich denke towards an empirical, embodied consciousness, but as the crossing towards a different way of living through the same corporality. Together with the insights of §1, this will bring us to a model that can account as well for Strawson’s sensitivity to the fact that our consciousness goes through a crucial turn, as well as for the concern that our body should not be seen as secondary and instrumental.