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Document Details :
Title: Doxastische en epistemische vrijheid
Author(s): DE BRUIN, Boudewijn
Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Volume: 71 Issue: 3 Date: 2009
This paper offers a new view of doxastic voluntarism, epistemic agency and doxastic responsibility. It assumes the perspective of political freedom and uses the stit-theoretic framework from modal logic to investigate the obstacles that other individuals could place in the way of the adoption of beliefs and the formation of knowledge. Interference with someone adopting a belief takes the form of physical and chemical influence on a person’s brain, either directly by medication or transcranial magnetic stimulation, or indirectly by sleep deprivation, induced stress, etc. Interference with someone forming knowledge about a proposition takes place at the levels of (i) investigative actions (I bar your access to the library), (ii) adoption of relevant belief, and (iii) the connection between the investigative actions and belief adoption (framing effects ensure systematic biases in ways that individuals use information from news shows). Institutional conclusions are discussed, especially with respect to epistemic paternalism.