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Document Details :

Title: Intention and Permissibility
Author(s): SAEMI, Amir
Journal: Ethical Perspectives
Volume: 16    Issue: 1   Date: March 2009   
Pages: 81-101
DOI: 10.2143/EP.16.1.2036279

Abstract :
There are two kinds of view in the literature concerning the relevance of intention to permissibility. While subjectivism assumes that an agent acts permissibly if he or she believes that their conduct is necessary for a moral purpose, for objectivism the de facto presence of an objective reason to justify one’s deeds is what matters. Recently, Scanlon and Hanser have defended a moderate version of objectivism and subjectivism, respectively. Although I have a degree of sympathy toward both views, I will argue that the truth lies somewhere in between. The view that I suggest in this paper hopefully occupies a space between subjectivism and objectivism and can accommodate the intuitions that neither of those views can account for.

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