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Document Details :
Title: Die Erstreckungen des Ich
Subtitle: Aristotelisch-neuplatonische Motive in Husserls Auseinandersetzung mit dem cartesianischen Raumbegriff
Author(s): ROESNER, Martina
Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Volume: 84 Issue: 2 Date: 2022
This article addresses Husserl’s phenomenology of space against the backdrop of the Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, and Cartesian approaches to the problem of spatiality. Husserl attempts to overcome Cartesian dualism, according to which extension is only a property of external, corporeal reality but not of the subject itself. The phenomenological constitution of space, by contrast, is founded on the topological experience of the movement of one’s own living body and its changing distance in relation to other material objects. However, Husserl never satisfactorily explains the relationship between this bodily, kinaesthetic constitution of space and the more original phenomenon of time-constitution on the innermost level of pure consciousness. Our paper claims that these inconsistencies in Husserl’s phenomenological approach to the problem of space are due to residual Cartesianism and could have been avoided had he adhered more consistently to the Neo-Platonic paradigm. In fact, Husserl’s monadological approach to subjectivity would have allowed him to conceive of pure consciousness as an intelligible sphere that permanently irradiates from its quelling source point, thus opening up the primordial, pre-geometric space between constituted immanent temporality and its pre-phenomenal, temporalizing origin.