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Document Details :
Title: Krijtlijnen voor een artificiële rechter
Author(s): OIMANN, Ann-Katrien
Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Volume: 83 Issue: 3 Date: 2021
Within the field of AI and Law, attempts are being made to model legal reasoning. Many arguments against algorithmic decision-making are based on the fact that algorithmic systems cannot meet the nature of legal reasoning. This paper claims that some of the traditional arguments that can be made against the use of algorithms in decision-making may be technically solvable in the future. A more fundamental argument is required if one wants to oppose fully automated decision-making systems. To this end, the first part of this paper explains why the use of algorithms in the judiciary is an appealing idea and provides a brief overview of the current state of the art in the domain of law and AI. The second part then discusses the transparency obligation and the duty to provide reasons and argues why these requirements are not necessarily an insurmountable problem when applied to algorithmic decision-making. The final section points to the inability of systems to give meaning that can serve as a basis when seeking fundamental arguments against algorithmic decision-making.