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Document Details :
Title: Zekerheid, vertrouwen, scepticisme
Author(s): BURMS, Arnold , DE DIJN, Herman
Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Volume: 81 Issue: 3 Date: 2019
We aim at defending the thesis that the quest for certain knowledge is a pseudo problem whose function is to hide a real problem: finding a foundation for trust. In developing this thesis we examine first two kinds of trust (trusting another person, trusting oneself). Both lead to the same paradox. For while trust is (obviously) fallible, it is also (somewhat less obviously) our paradigm of certainty. The question then concerns why exactly that trust can be at the same time certain (trust is the paradigm of certainty) and uncertain (trust is vulnerable or fallible) (section 2 and 3). We then attempt to elucidate this paradox, and come to the conclusion that while trust is opposed to the risks that might subvert it, it is at the same time somehow dependent on these risks (section 4). The paradox of trust plays also a central role in our explanation of why a pseudo problem (the quest for certainty) was substituted for the real problem (the foundation of trust). The answer is that the existence of a definitive solution would then seem to be conceivable, whereas no such solution exists for the real problem (section 5). Finally, in agreeing with Carnap that the sceptical problem about the existence of the external world is devoid of any relevance for scientific research, we are particularly interested in the idea stressed by the sceptic — that we are from time to time deceived without ever discovering it. This idea turns out to be indispensable for the world we live in, for the world outside objectifying science.