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Document Details :
Title: Deleuze's Nietzsche on Becoming What One Is
Author(s): BOWDEN, Sean
Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Volume: 81 Issue: 1 Date: 2019
In Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze treats Nietzsche’s published and unpublished works as parts of a coherent and systematic philosophy that hinges on the central ontological claim that thought and reality are the product of moving relations between pre-individual and pre-subjective forces. Despite the comprehensive and systematic ambitions of Nietzsche and Philosophy, however, there are a number of notions in Nietzsche’s oeuvre that Deleuze does not explicitly touch upon, and whose compatibility with an underlying ontology of forces is not at all obvious. In particular, it is difficult at first glance to reconcile the Nietzschean task of 'becoming what one is' — along with attendant notions such as self-creation and agency — with this ontology. This is because an ontology of pre-subjective forces appears to entail that the thought of the one becoming what he or she is, is merely epiphenomenal. The aim of this paper is to resist this move by reconstructing and clarifying a Deleuzo-Nietzschean conception of becoming what one is. I will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss the concepts and claims from which the Nietzschean notion of 'becoming what one is' is inseparable. Second, I will outline the main claims constitutive of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche in Nietzsche and Philosophy. Finally, I will offer an account of the notion of becoming what one is in terms of the ontology of forces advanced by Deleuze’s Nietzsche.