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Document Details :
Title: Scotus in Paris
Subtitle: On Univocity and the Portions of the Soul
Author(s): GORIS, Wouter
Journal: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales
Volume: 85 Issue: 2 Date: 2018
The historical-critical edition of John Duns Scotus’s Reportatio Parisiensis will not only provide us with a reliable text of the Parisian lectures on the Sentences, but also give the means to evaluate claims in recent scholarship according to which Duns Scotus 'changed his mind' in Paris on a number of fundamental philosophical issues. In the present contribution, we critically discuss one such claim, namely that Duns Scotus rejected the doctrine of the univocity of being and the associated doctrine of being as the first adequate object of the intellect in distinction 24 of the second Book of the Reportatio Parisiensis. The survey of all available material clearly shows that, while in Paris, Duns Scotus continued to endorse these central philosophical doctrines, albeit in a different way. The Additiones magnae to the second Book, which William of Alnwick compiled on the basis of Scotus’s lectures, prove important in establishing the Parisian teachings of Duns Scotus. Hence the present enquiry emphasizes the need to consider in more detail the problem of the relation between the Additiones magnae secundi libri and the second Book of the Reportatio Parisiensis.