Peeters Online Bibliographies
Peeters Publishers
this issue
  previous article in this issuenext article in this issue  

Document Details :

Title: Moral Reasons as Other-Regarding Reasons
Author(s): GRONHOLZ, Shane
Journal: Ethical Perspectives
Volume: 25    Issue: 2   Date: 2018   
Pages: 285-319
DOI: 10.2143/EP.25.2.3284948

Abstract :
Is it possible for an agent to morally wrong herself or are our moral obligations limited to our treatment of others? In this article, I aim to defend a view about what is distinctive about moral reasons and moral obligations. In particular, I argue that moral reasons are only those reasons an agent has to treat other individuals in certain ways, for their own sakes. Conversely, an agent never has a moral reason to treat herself in any way, for her own sake. This means that an agent’s moral obligations are limited to the obligations she has regarding her treatment of other individuals and she never has a moral obligation regarding the treatment of herself.

download article