|previous article in this issue||next article in this issue|
Document Details :
Title: L'opposition entre Georg Misch et Edmund Husserl sur la vie, le vécu et la réflexion
Author(s): CALENGE, Simon
Journal: Etudes phénoménologiques - Phenomenological Studies
Volume: 2 Date: 2018
The usual view on the relationship between phenomenology and philosophy of life is that Husserl’s views came closer and closer to Dilthey’s doctrine. Such a view considers the philosophy of life as a kind of well delineated doctrine that is no longer developing. What I want to show is that the Göttingen circle gave a new impulse to the philosophy of life. Georg Misch, Hans Lipps, and Josef König discussed Husserl’s views and criticized his attempt to integrate Dilthey’s thought. Despite the similarities, there are indeed radical differences between phenomenology and the philosophy of life with regard to life-experience, life itself, and the reflection on life. For Husserl life-experience is a subjective event within consciousness while Misch describes it as a milieu that encompasses consciousness. Reflection is for Husserl a process that takes life-experience as an external object, whereas Misch sees reflection as a process that structures life-experience from the inside.