 previous article in this issue | next article in this issue  |
|
Document Details : Title: ‘Ernstige verstandelijke beperking’ als verstorende factor Subtitle: Een beschouwing over mens-zijn en persoon-zijn Author(s): REINDERS, Hans Journal: Tijdschrift voor Theologie Volume: 47 Issue: 2 Date: 2007 Pages: 185-208 DOI: 10.2143/TVT.47.2.3203524 Abstract : This article contends that the category ‘profoundly disabled’ disturbs Roman Catholic moral theology as it does liberal ethics. Roman Catholic moral theology teaches that human life starts at the moment of conception and that as of that moment the developing human individual is due the same moral protection as any other person. The argument for this position is that human life is determined by its origin: how could life that inherits its characteristics from the persons from which it arises be anything other than personal? This argument rejects the liberal bio-ethical view in which protection is dependent on personal characteristics (the ability to reason and desire, consciousness, mental competence, etc.). It is argued that personal existence is an ontological, not a phenomenological, observation and that it therefore does not depend on the manifestation of these characteristics. Agere sequitur esse, and not the reverse. However, when one asks about the destiny of human life, Roman Catholic moral theology appears to make it dependent on the correct use of, and not just the development of the abilities that characterise the person. While their actual presence plays no role in whether someone deserves protection, they are decisive in judging human destiny. This article juxtaposes the statements on genesis and telos by posing the question of their consequences on the judgment passed on the lives of people with profound intellectual disability. The argument arising from their origin supports fully the moral demand that they be protected; the argument arising from human destiny can do no other than label their existence ‘defective’. In the case of profound disability the disparity with the liberal teleological position is much smaller than moral theologians appear to realise. It is not the intention of this analysis to let liberal ethics in through the back door. On the contrary, this analysis is used as argument in favour of giving greater weight in this matter to moral theology’s theological character: human destiny is not the crowning achievement of rational moral life, but a gift from God in which all people share regardless of the state or condition of their bodies. |
|
