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Document Details :
Title: Intentionalisme et phénoménologie de l'intentionnalité
Author(s): SERON, Denis
Journal: Etudes phénoménologiques - Phenomenological Studies
Volume: 1 Date: 2017
This paper presents an argument in favor of a 'phenomenological' approach to intentionality. This approach, as I see it, involves the view that intentional facts are better expressed with the help of appearance words ('seems', 'appears', 'is similar to', etc.). By contrast, what I call the 'intentionalist approach' assumes that intentional facts are better expressed by intentional verbs. The argument is as follows. First, it is well-known that the use of intentional verbs to express typically intentional facts generates anomalies with respect to existential generalization, substitution of identicals, and the principle of excluded middle. Secondly, I argue that the use of appearance words does not generate the same anomalies, which suggests that appearance words are more appropriate to describe intentional facts. This, I conclude, is an argument for preferring the phenomenological to the intentionalist approach to intentionality.