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Document Details :
Title: Doxastischer Voluntarismus bei Thomas von Aquin
Subtitle: Wille, Intellekt und ihr schwieriges Verhältnis zur Zustimmung
Author(s): SCHÜSSLER, Rudolf
Journal: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales
Volume: 79 Issue: 1 Date: 2012
Direct doxastic voluntarism claims that human beings can voluntarily decide what to believe in exactly the same way as they decide to raise an arm. Aquinas is often regarded as a proponent of this doctrine, which is widely rejected by modern philosophers. Modern defenders of Aquinas try to show that he in fact accepted a less problematic indirect doxastic voluntarism. However, some early modern scholastics ascribed more than an indirect doxastic voluntarism to Aquinas. The present article discusses these scholastic interpretations and argues that Aquinas held a direct voluntarism of passing or suspending judgment on probable propositions in addition to an indirect doxastic voluntarism. None of these voluntarisms amount to a form of direct doxastic voluntarism in the modern sense.