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Document Details :
Subtitle: Mackies leibniziaanse herinterpretatie van Lockes theorie van persoonsidentiteit
Author(s): DE VLEESCHOUWER, Gregory
Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Volume: 71 Issue: 4 Date: 2009
In his book, Problems from Locke, John Leslie Mackie presents a theory of personal identity (pi) that is meant to be a supplement and correction of Locke’s pi-theory. In the first part I introduce the criterion of pi that was standard before Locke’s pi-theory. By showing in the second part how Locke reacted against this traditional criterion, I show wherein the singularity of Locke’s pi-theory exists. In the third part I explain how Leibniz is moved by the same solicitude as Locke, but also how he at the same time undermines that solicitude by giving it a place in his monadic system. By doing so, Leibniz — in his own distinctive way — harks back to the traditional pi-approach.
Leibniz’ thoughts on pi do not form an integral part of the contemporary debate on pi. Still, he exercised a lot of influence in the topic. In the last part I demonstrate this by analyzing Mackie’s pi-theory in which the identity of the brain is central. I show how Mackie’s theory, because it reinterprets Locke’s theory in a Leibnizian way — with the intention to improve Locke’s theory — neglects the crux and main concern of that theory.