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Document Details :
Title: Vrijheid - het ideaal van de metafysica
Subtitle: Kritische kanttekeningen bij Dilthey's Schlussbetrachtung über die Unmöglichkeit der metaphysischen Stellung des Erkennes
Author(s): VENNIX, Ad
Volume: 69 Issue: 2 Date: 2008
In the last section of his Introduction to the Human Sciences Dilthey claims that from its very beginnings western metaphysics has been oriented towards a panlogistic goal that received its most adequate formulation in Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. According to Dilthey, this principle leaves little or no room for the sovereignity of the will and the personal freedom that man finds within his self-consciousness and lived experiences.
In this paper we argue that Dilthey gives a rather one-sided and somewhat distorted view not only of the goal of modern metaphysics, but also (and more or less as a consequence) of the essence of human freedom. As a matter of fact the great metaphysicians of the 17th and 18th centuries (Descartes, Leibniz and Kant) considered the solution of the problem of human freedom the cornerstone of all metaphysics. However, unlike Dilthey, they sought to understand human freedom within the conceptual framework of grounds and reasons, thereby giving these notions a depth and a differentiation that are completely overlooked by Dilthey.