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Document Details : Title: Harry Frankfurt on the Will, Autonomy and Necessity Author(s): CUYPERS, Stefaan E. Journal: Ethical Perspectives Volume: 5 Issue: 1 Date: April 1998 Pages: 44-52 DOI: 10.2143/EP.5.1.563107 Abstract : In this paper, I want to give an interpretation of Harry Frankfurt’s complex theory of the will with respect to the issue of “autonomy and necessity”. My central claim is that Frankfurt’s employment of the concept of the will is equivocal. He actually uses three distinct conceptions of the will without ever distinguishing them from one another. I shall introduce and justify such a clarifying tripartite distinction. Although my discussion will be limited to Frankfurt’s view of the will, this distinction and the points made about its components can easily be generalized. In my opinion, then, such a tripartite distinction must form an essential part of any rich theory of the will. Both the first and the second conception of the will can readily be understood within the scope of the debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism. The third conception, however, transcends the framework of this classical opposition because the autonomy of this third kind of will positively requires necessity. Autonomy is not only compatible with necessity (or determinism): according to the third conception, the former also intrinsically involves the latter. Although this conception of the will is somewhat unfamiliar and non-standard in the debate, I shall try to show that it captures an important fact about our volitional nature — a deep fact which is often overlooked or neglected. |
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