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Document Details : Title: The Hermesian Dimension to the Newman-Perrone Dialogue Author(s): BRENT, A. Journal: Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses Volume: 61 Issue: 1 Date: April 1985 Pages: 73-99 DOI: 10.2143/ETL.61.1.556298 Abstract : This paper will connect Perrone's specific notes criticising Newman's theory of development with his previous preoccupation over many years in defeating Hermes and his school . My thesis in this respect will follow that of previous papers in that I will be arguing that, contrary to widespread contemporary belief, the differences between Newman and Perrone on doctrinal development and faith were not purely verbal but rather about quite substantive issues so that Rome's failure to censure Newman at this time had a purely diplomatic motivation. I will demonstrate how Perrone's objections had previously been conditioned by his role in formulating the Brief of Gregory XVI, Dum Acerbissimas (1835) and its aftermath, which condemned the German school of Kantian, catholic theologians founded by George Hermes. Newman complained from Rome in 1846 that his views on faith were suspected of Hermesianism specifically on the grounds of his argument in the Development on faith and probability. Newman had written this in his letter to Dalgairns of 8th December 1846 . On 25th July 1847 the condemnation of 1835 was confirmed . It should be noted that Hermesianism prefigured in the consciousness of many of Newman's contemporaries as one of the foremost intellectual movements of the age. Tate, then Headmaster of Rugby, wrote in 1844 to Oxford's Vice-Chancellor of the four schools of the Church of England and said concerning the last of these: "My belief is that it... contains by far the greatest amount of talent of the rising generation" whose "theological sympathies are very comprehensive, seeming most to range from Mr Carlyle or Schleiermacher on the one hand, to Mr Newman, or the Hermesianer of Germany, or Moehler's Symbolik on the other". The atmosphere at Rome at the time was therefore alive with the continuining controversy in which Perrone was at the centre as he fought successfully against the efforts of such German theologians as Braun and Elvenich to have the condemnation of Dum Acerbissimas reversed. This paper will show specifically that Rome's reaction to Newman's thesis on development did not result merely from the detection of a vague equivalence between Hermes and Newman on moral, non-demonstrative certainty. From such a Roman reaction Perrone may well have exempted himself at least with some qualifications since he, as is well known, accepted moral certainty in some sense . Rather Rome's reaction was shared by Perrone . Newman's method of doing theology appeared to Perrone suspiciously close to what he described as the analytic method, heavily orientated towards psychological certitude, and characterised as a method of discovery. |
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