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Document Details : Title: Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals Author(s): GALLUZZO, G. Journal: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales Volume: 71 Issue: 1 Date: 2004 Pages: 131-171 DOI: 10.2143/RTPM.71.1.504403 Abstract : Throughout his career Aquinas held to the Avicennian doctrine that the nature or essence of sensible substances is somehow indifferent. According to Aquinas's version of this well-known doctrine an essence as such posssesses only those characteristics which are specified in its definition. The essence of a human being, for instance, possesses as such animality and rationality and nothing else. On this view, all the other characteristics and in particular general properties like being one or many, universal or particular, do not belong to essence as such, but are attributed to it only in so far as it enjoys a particular mode of existence. Essence, for instance, is in itself neither universal nor particular, but is universal in so far as it exists in the intellect and particular in its extra-mental existence in different individuals. Although Aquinas is entirely consistent all through his career in maintaining that essence as such is neither universal nor particular, there is a point of viw from which the essence of a sensible substance can be regarded as universal or common, namely the point of view of inviduation. |
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