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Document Details : Title: Wittgenstein over de zekerheid van het godsdienstig geloof Author(s): BURMS, Arnold , DE DIJN, Herman Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie Volume: 83 Issue: 4 Date: 2021 Pages: 661-681 DOI: 10.2143/TVF.83.4.3290132 Abstract : This article has two aims. First, we will put forward an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s notion of certainty. We propose that for Wittgenstein, trust is the paradigm of certainty. Two consequences follow from this thesis: (1) in trusting one has as much certainty as one might possibly have; and (2) all trust is necessarily insecure although it is not possible to entertain this idea while one trusts. Second we will offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s views on the philosophy of religion. To address the question of religion we turn, first, to Wittgenstein’s 'Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough'. In his remarks Wittgenstein attempts to make sense of ‘primitive’ rituals by relating them to practices also familiar to those in contemporary culture who endorse them without any supporting belief. This implies that in endorsing their rituals, primitive societies do not need any controversial belief or doctrine. Maintaining this interpretation becomes, however, much more difficult when religion turns from ritual practices to the question of what one has to believe, as is the case in Christianity. After having pointed out some of these seemingly insurmountable difficulties, we suggest — with the help of an article of Peter Winch — that also in the case of Christian faith it is quite possible for some people (but not for Wittgenstein himself) to put their trust in something as vulnerable as a particular language game. |
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