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Document Details : Title: The Naturalistic Tendencies of Husserl's Phenomenology Author(s): MIECHELS, Tim Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie Volume: 83 Issue: 4 Date: 2021 Pages: 633-660 DOI: 10.2143/TVF.83.4.3290131 Abstract : In this article, I will examine Heidegger’s claim that Husserl does not escape the designation 'naturalism'. This accusation is far from self-evident, especially since Husserl thinks of naturalism as one of the greatest philosophical errors. Heidegger’s reason for claiming this is that he sees Husserl’s philosophical project as being driven by a care for certainty. This means that despite Husserl’s explicit refusal to understand consciousness or ideas in terms of nature, he fails to tackle the root of the problem, which is the definition of the human being as a rational animal. I will try to shed further light on Heidegger’s accusation by first analyzing Husserl’s criticism of naturalism and historicism in Philosophy as Rigorous Science. Following this, I will look at Heidegger’s interpretation of Husserl’s criticism as driven by a care about certainty in Introduction to Phenomenological Research and Heidegger’s examination of the relation between human beings and the world in History of the Concept of Time. |
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