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Document Details : Title: Prioritarianism and Other-Regarding Decision-Making under Risk Author(s): VOLACU, Alexandru Journal: Ethical Perspectives Volume: 24 Issue: 2 Date: 2017 Pages: 199-224 DOI: 10.2143/EP.24.2.3218002 Abstract : In the present contribution I attempt to refute a recent challenge raised by Michael Otsuka against prioritarianism, according to which the priority view is objectionable since it rejects the moral permissibility of choosing in accordance with rational self-interest – understood as maximization of expected utility – in one-person cases involving other-regarding decision-making under risk. I claim that Otsuka’s argument is bound to make an illegitimate move, which is either to assume implausibly that individuals are generally risk-neutral or to assume implausibly that the decision-maker in his cases can have accurate information on the attitudes towards risk held by the individual on behalf of whom the decision is taken. I argue, pace Otsuka, that acting in accordance with rational self-interest in cases characterized by these types of epistemic constraints requires that we adopt a view on other-regarding decision-making that takes into account general empirical facts about human nature and that prioritarianism does not conflict with this latter view. |
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