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Document Details : Title: Defending Sufficientarianism Author(s): ALBÆK HENRIKSEN, Jeanette Journal: Ethical Perspectives Volume: 24 Issue: 2 Date: 2017 Pages: 181-198 DOI: 10.2143/EP.24.2.3218001 Abstract : In the present article, I aim to defend and slightly revise the ideal of Freedom from Duress as presented by Axelsen and Nielsen. I will argue that by perceiving the two categories of capabilities as they are presented in the ideal, that is capabilities related to basic needs and capabilities related to the fundamental interests of a human being in a social setting, as two distinct threshold-bundles, some priority between the two is possible and this hence eliminates the problem of threshold-fetishism in the ideal of Freedom from Duress. As in the original formulation of the ideal, I stand by the negative thesis in its strongest formulation, but add the distinction between justice and fairness in order to make an intuitively adequate argument against any reformulation of the negative thesis. |
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