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Document Details : Title: Alle ervaringen tellen mee Subtitle: Over de epistemische betekenis van bijzondere openbaring Author(s): VAN DEN BRINK, Gijsbert Journal: Tijdschrift voor Theologie Volume: 53 Issue: 2 Date: 2013 Pages: 145-154 DOI: 10.2143/TVT.53.2.3203316 Abstract : In the first chapters of his God in an Age of Science? Herman Philipse argues that well-educated Westerners can no longer reasonably adhere to a religious faith with reference to a form of divine revelation. Any religious truth claims they make should be accounted for with arguments that are generally accessible and comprehensible. In this connection Philipse uses the terms ‘rational theology’ or ‘natural theology’ as opposed to ‘revealed theology’. Many believers, however, do not justify their faith by pointing to rational arguments, but rather by appealing to religious experiences, Biblical or ecclesiastical traditions they find convincing and/or a more fundamental feeling of being addressed ‘from beyond’. As far as they are concerned, all experiences matter, not just those that can be made generally comprehensible. This article argues that from an epistemological point of view, those believers are within their rights. The argument put forward for this proposition is as follows: the many centuries of debates on the status of a faith in God on the basis of reason alone have yielded no unequivocal results, not even after the scientific revolution. That is a hard fact we should not dismiss as Philipse does, but instead we should find a proper philosophical explanation for it. I am trying to find that explanation in the fact that whenever (the justification of) views of life is concerned, rationality and ultimate commitments are inextricably bound up with each other. Using an analysis of American philosopher George Mavrodes, I show that this is connected with the fact that ‘proofs’ are by definition person-relative. In science, we can usually ignore the consequences of this fact because we agree on the main premises (regardless of our view of life). But we do not agree on the epistemological status of religious beliefs or views of life: no matter how many arguments for or against we advance, and no matter what new directions the intellectual debate on the status of a faith in God will take, we cannot reach a conclusion that is shared by all. This appears to be inherent to the condition humaine. It is from this perspective that I show why the six arguments Philipse advances for the priority of natural theology are unconvincing. This does not imply, however, that rational arguments with regard to belief in God are of no value whatsoever; surely they do have some significance, for believers as well as for non-believers, and especially for those who feel somewhere in between. |
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