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Document Details : Title: De waarneming als intentionaliteit en als werkelijkheid Subtitle: Bijdrage tot de grammatica van de waarneming Author(s): BENOIST, Jocelyn Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie Volume: 78 Issue: 2 Date: 2016 Pages: 251-275 DOI: 10.2143/TVF.78.2.3175629 Abstract : In recent philosophy it has been much disputed whether the content of perception is conceptual or not. This paper advocates the view that it is trivial to say that the content of perception is conceptual, if one considers perception in its mere epistemic significance. In this regard, the concept of perception is indeed completely determined by the idea of the object of perception. The concept of perception, however, is bi-dimensional. Perception, certainly, is essentially intentional. However, a certain reality plays an essential part in it: the one of the sensible being that can be determined thus or thus in a perception, but that, as sensible reality, nevertheless remains as it is. Gestalt Theory can be interpreted as an exploration of one side of this reality, insofar as it has to do with something other than the intentionality of perception: i.e. with those structures of the perceivable thing that make it perceivable. In perception, the reality of the sensible element and the unreality of content should be logically distinguished. Thus, to open a new, non-epistemic dimension for perceptual realism, is possible. |
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