<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<rss version="2.0">
<channel>
	<title>Ethical Perspectives</title>
	<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=journal&amp;journal_code=EP</link>
	<description>Recent articles</description>
	<item>
		<title>Does Humanism Necessarily Imply Speciesism?</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.1.3294141</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=3294141</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 11:40:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<description>
			
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>The Social Model of Impairment</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.1.3294142</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=3294142</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 11:41:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<description>
			This paper presents a critique of the social model of impairment. It situates the social model of impairment within the broader framework of the social model of disability, where the distinction between disability and impairment originates. The paper begins by outlining the social model of disability and contrasting it with the individual (medical) model. It then offers an initial critique of the social model. Subsequently, two strategies employed to defend the social model are analysed. The first strategy posits that critiques of the social model arise from misinterpretations; however, this paper argues that such an approach reduces substantive issues to mere semantic debates. The second strategy, which serves as the primary focus of this paper, asserts that both disability and impairment are socially constructed. This argument is critiqued on the grounds that it relies on inconclusive evidence and, if accepted, would lead to nihilistic implications, ultimately undermining the moral responsibility of able-bodied individuals to support those with severe disabilities.
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Bracketing Who is Right</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.1.3294143</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=3294143</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 11:43:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<description>
			The paper argues that the ethics of compromise, toleration, and war sometimes have to bracket who is right in the underlying conflict. It starts by highlighting a parallel between the ethics of compromise, toleration, and war: All three sometimes seem to apply symmetrically to those who are right and those who are wrong. It then discusses three attempts to make sense of this without bracketing who is right: one employs the idea of secondary oughts, a second appeals to conventions that are justifiably articulated in neutral terms, a third interprets the relevant oughts as subjective. The paper tries to show that none of them succeeds, and it concludes that we should embrace the view that the ethics of compromise, toleration, and war sometimes have to bracket who is right. The deeper rationale for this view, it suggests, is that sometimes all parties to a conflict must count as legitimate.
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Contributors</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.1.3294144</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=3294144</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 11:43:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<description>
			Contributors
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Contributors</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.2.3294257</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=3294257</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 11:44:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<description>
			Contributors
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Moral Conflicts and the Limits of Moral Theory</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.2.3294253</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=3294253</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 11:46:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<description>
			
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>The Obligation to Morally Enhance Psychopaths Using Biotechnologies</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.2.3294254</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=3294254</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 11:47:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<description>
			This manuscript draws on the under-explored Kantian duty of moral perfection to contend that psychopaths have a moral imperative to undergo biotechnological moral enhancement via DBS (Deep Brain Stimulation). In addition, non-psychopaths are obliged to help psychopaths acquire such measures that will align them with this duty. We justify that this is necessary to free them from any inclinations that may hinder their ability to pursue their ends further. Although this manuscript has only drawn on this duty to interrogate key questions around biotechnological enhancement, we believe this duty has more value than articulated in this current manuscript. Hence, we recommend more evaluative studies that draw on this duty to interrogate other ethical questions.
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Book Review</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.2.3294256</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=3294256</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 11:49:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<description>
			Book review
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Can a Risk be a Harm, and When is Imposing Risk Wrong?</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.2.3294255</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=3294255</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 11:52:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<description>
			
		</description>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
