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Title: Did Scotus Modify his Position on the Relationship of Intellect and Will?
Author(s): INGHAM, Mary Beth
Journal: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales
Volume: 69    Issue: 1   Date: 2002   
Pages: 88-116
DOI: 10.2143/RTPM.69.1.965

Abstract :
This article examines the claim that Duns Scotus’s position on the will’s freedom changed between his early Lectura teaching to his late Reportatio lectures on Distinction 25 of Book II of the Sentences. Stephen Dumont in “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?” suggests that Scotus moves closer to the position of Henry of Ghent on the will. The Franciscan had criticized that position in his earlier teaching. In order to demonstrate that Scotus’s voluntarism continues to be moderate, the author first explicates the notion of a rational will in Scotist thought, by means of the two affections of the will (in Anselm) and the position outlined in Scotus’s Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Book IX, Q. 15. Following this, a textual comparison of Lectura II, D. 25 with Reportatio II, D. 25 shows that there is indeed a shift, but not toward a more exaggerated form of voluntarism. Rather, close reading of these texts reveals that, in his early teaching, Scotus did not think the will was the rational potency, and did not identify its freedom with rationality. In the later Parisian teaching he presents the will as the sole rational potency, thereby diminishing the role of the intellect, but not that of rationality. The textual evidence of Ordinatio II, D. 6, Questions on the Metaphysics, Lectura II, D. 25 and Reportatio II, D. 25 show that Scotus’s final teaching on the will integrates rationality into the functioning of freedom, and does not align him with Henry’s position, despite similarity of language.

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