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Document Details :

Title: Moralised Definitions of Freedom, Autonomy, and the Personal Value of Opportunities to Perform Morally Impermissible Actions
Author(s): INTROPI, Pietro
Journal: Ethical Perspectives
Volume: 28    Issue: 4   Date: 2021   
Pages: 417-443
DOI: 10.2143/EP.28.4.3290395

Abstract :
Are opportunities to perform morally impermissible actions valuable? And, if so, has their value any role to play in normative arguments? In the present article I examine the personal value of opportunities to perform morally impermissible actions: the value that such opportunities have in virtue of contributing to someone’s autonomy and wellbeing. In particular, I discuss the relevance of the value of opportunities to perform morally impermissible actions for assessing moralised definitions of freedom in the context of an ethical system that appeals to axiological considerations, and I examine Raz’s account of the relationships between freedom and autonomy. Moralised definitions of freedom can be understood as claiming that only unobstructed opportunities to perform morally permissible actions should count as freedoms. I show that considerations concerning the personal value of the opportunities to perform morally impermissible actions underpin traditional critiques of moralised definitions and that emphasising this aspect allows us to extend such critiques with new lines of argument. Furthermore, I discuss whether an argument recently advanced by Kramer can be framed as an internal critique of Raz’s account of the relationships between freedom and autonomy.

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