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Document Details : Title: Broome on Enkrasia and Akrasia Author(s): LEE, Byeong D. Journal: Logique et Analyse Volume: 254 Date: 2021 Pages: 175-189 DOI: 10.2143/LEA.254.0.3289656 Abstract : John Broome defends what he calls ‘Enkrasia’, which is roughly this: Rationality requires of you that if you believe that you ought to do A, you intend to do A. He provides two arguments for Enkrasia. First, he argues for what he calls ‘enkratic reasoning’: ‘I ought to do A. So I shall do A’. Second, he also provides the following line of argument: Enkrasia is the requirement not to be akratic; akrasia is irrational; so Enkrasia is a rational requirement. The purpose of this paper is to show that these two arguments are not successful. For this purpose, I argue for two things. The alleged enkratic reasoning is not a genuine rule of reasoning. And it is not appropriate to understand Enkrasia in terms of akrasia, either. |
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