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Document Details : Title: Apofatische en katafatische theologie bij Thomas van Aquino Author(s): TEGTMEYER, Henning Journal: Tijdschrift voor Theologie Volume: 58 Issue: 4 Date: 2018 Pages: 365-380 DOI: 10.2143/TVT.58.4.3285569 Abstract : My aim in this paper is twofold. (1) I will develop a resolutely kataphatic reading of Aquinas’s theology against the background of the still predominant neo-Platonic apophaticism in Aquinas scholarship. (2) This will have implications for neo-Platonic readings of Aquinas in general since it will transpire that Aquinas develops his theology almost entirely without Platonic concepts, theorems and methods, especially in his vigorous re-interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius and other neo-Platonic Christian theologians according to the spirit and the principles of Aristotelian philosophy. Proponents of an apophatic interpretation tend to overlook the diversity of forms of negation in Aquinas and the important nuances of their usage. For example, there is a crucial difference between the negation of a predicate simply qua content and its negation qua negation of an implicit limitation, or so I will argue. This difference is reflected in Thomas’s distinction between negatio and remotio, that is, between negation and expansion or removal. The significance of this distinction is heavily underestimated in many of the contemporary studies on Aquinas. The systematic upshot of this inquiry will be that Aquinas provides us with an example of a genuinely philosophical theology that bridges the gap between philosophy and faith-based theology. If my argument is correct such a bridge needs to be kataphatic rather than apophatic. |
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