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Document Details : Title: Psychologization of Injustice? Subtitle: On Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognitive Justice Author(s): PILAPIL, Renate Journal: Ethical Perspectives Volume: 18 Issue: 1 Date: 2011 Pages: 79-106 DOI: 10.2143/EP.18.1.2066214 Abstract : The present paper critically reconstructs Honneth’s recognition-theoretical conception of justice modelled on the formation of intact personal identity or self-realization. It looks into the status of using psychological evidence as a basis for a theory of justice, and whether or not such an approach of justice fails the publicity criterion. The claim is that although Honneth’s thesis is potentially susceptible to the charge of psychologization of injustice as Fraser alleges, the idea that recognition impacts on the formation or malformation of personal identity should not be denied a critical role in a theory of justice. Doing so prevents a faceless or subject-less discourse of injustice. The paper also argues that recognitive justice founded on very specific moral-psychological assumptions passes the test of publicity. The challenge is how to establish the necessary conditions that enable victims of misrecognition to have a language and name their experience of suffering publicly. |
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