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Document Details : Title: Berkeley, Perceivability and Human Omniscience Author(s): GRIGORYAN, Kristine Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie Volume: 87 Issue: 4 Date: 2025 Pages: 691-729 DOI: 10.2143/TVF.87.4.3295736 Abstract : This paper explores the conceptualization of Berkeley’s anti-realism and the formulation of a variation of the knowability thesis. It specifically examines the possibility of propositional knowledge in Berkeley’s epistemology, as a knowability framework typically requires such a foundation. The paper argues that Berkeley is committed to a variation of the knowability thesis, referred to here as the perceivability thesis. While this thesis does not formally lead to a modal collapse, unlike the standard knowability thesis that collapses into the human omniscience thesis via a Church-Fitch style argument, further analysis reveals that Berkeley’s framework ultimately suggests otherwise. By endorsing the factive perceivability thesis and the strong transparency thesis, Berkeley’s position formally leads to the convergence of possible and actual perception, thereby implicitly endorsing the human omniscience thesis regarding immediate perceptions. |
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