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Document Details : Title: Hedwig Conrad-Martinus on Reality and Mind-Independence Author(s): NEUMANN, Daniel Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie Volume: 87 Issue: 3 Date: 2025 Pages: 455-476 DOI: 10.2143/TVF.87.3.3295572 Abstract : In her Realontologie of 1923, the early phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius seeks to provide a phenomenological account of reality according to which the appearance of objects is entailed by, or grounded in, their existence. I discuss Conrad-Martius’ approach to reality with respect to what I dub her 'real-ontological' categories. Real-ontological categories comprise the properties we attribute to objects insofar as they are (perceived as) real. I thus understand her account as offering the ontological and phenomenological means to determine what it is for a perceived object to be real, in terms of being the subject of real-ontological properties. Subsequently, I discuss how her approach can be brought to bear on recent discussions on mind-independence. In this context, I consider how her phenomenological considerations differ, in terms of perceptual evidence, from accounts which construe mind-independence as the continued existence unperceived of objects. |
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