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Document Details : Title: Reductio ad absurdum in Spinoza's Philosophy Author(s): PARK, So Yun Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie Volume: 87 Issue: 2 Date: 2025 Pages: 313-334 DOI: 10.2143/TVF.87.2.3295274 Abstract : This paper examines Spinoza’s use of reduction to absurdity, situating it within its historical context to highlight its originality. During the 17th century, the authority of Euclidean geometry was contested, with mathematicians and philosophers challenging ancient geometers’ reliance on reductio ad absurdum proof, deeming it unsuitable for elucidating the mind. However, although informed by these traditions, Spinoza departs significantly from both classical and contemporary accounts. I contend that in Spinoza’s philosophy, reduction to absurdity assumes a new role as an analytic feigning through which ignorant minds can dissolve their prejudices. For Spinoza, Euclidean geometry provides a model for how the mind could think soundly about beings of reason, including beings of imagination — negations imagined positively — which are the proper objects of apagogical reasoning. Central to this thesis is the concept of feigning, an activity by which the mind spontaneously perceives reality through a lens of double negation. From this vantage point, reductio ad absurdum offers the most direct and reliable path to certain knowledge, training the mind’s power to reason validly even in the condition of ignorance. |
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