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	<title>Tijdschrift voor Filosofie</title>
	<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=journal&amp;journal_code=TVF</link>
	<description>Recent articles</description>
	<item>
		<title>Ter inleiding</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977253</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977253</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:09:29 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			Introduction
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Vriendschap en nihilisme</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977254</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977254</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:11:35 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			When we, from a Nietzschean perspective, read through the history of philosophical thinking about friendship (Aristotle, Cicero, Montaigne, Kant), we find that the idealization of friendship leads inevitably to the problem of nihilism. This confronts us with the question whether friendship is still possible under nihilistic conditions. Nietzsche himself claims on the one hand that in our nihilistic condition only something like friendship can save us, but on the other hand that friendship itself has been unmasked and has become impossible by these very conditions. It seems we are struck in the nihilistic paradox of not being allowed to believe in the possibility of what we cannot do without. Literary imagination since the 19th century (from Turgenjew and Dostojevksy through to Houellebecq and Zeh) seems to make us even more skeptical. Maybe Beckett provides an illustration of a way out that fits well with Nietzsche’s claim that only &#039;the most moderate, those who do not require any extreme articles of faith&#039; will be able to cope with nihilism. We might extend this to a moderate concept of friendship: in an age in which the great ideal of friendship erodes together with all ideality, we can only survive as long as we know that we’re not alone. Maybe that’s friendship: no perfection, no virtuosity, no lofty ideal, but simply this: to know that one is not all alone.
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Met het oog op de samenleving</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977255</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977255</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:12:19 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			not available
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>De januskop van de democratie</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977256</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977256</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:14:40 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			In recent years Dutch society has been stirred by waves of anger and resentment. What are the sources of this discontent and resentment? Populist parties like those of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders are not so much the cause of this resentment but the skillful exploiters of an underlying discontent which is endemic to modern democracies in general. The central claim of this article is that if we want to understand this underlying discontent we need to reconsider our conception of democracy. Instead of seeing democracy exclusively as the realization of the good life and the battleground for the emancipation of disadvantaged groups, we should focus more on the enduring tension between equality and inequality and the resentment this tension produces. Democracy has a Janus face: one face shows democracy as the source of empowerment and emancipation, the other face shows democracy as the source of resentment. Using the work of Nietzsche, Scheler, Rawls, Ferro, and Sloterdijk the nature and social consequences of resentment are discussed.
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Leren ordelijk te denken</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977257</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977257</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:16:32 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			This contribution discusses the views of the medieval theologian Henry of Ghent on the role of the teacher in the acquisition of knowledge. According to Henry, teaching is basically aimed at assisting a pupil in his acquisition of truth. In teaching, the role of language as the vehicle of truth is crucial: in order to acquire knowledge one needs to think correctly, and the only way to learn how to think correctly is through a correct use of language. After presenting an analysis of Henry’s ideas on the essence of learning and teaching, the paper will deal with their implications for the practice of teaching. Next a review of contemporary views on education will be presented. The contribution will conclude with a few remarks on how Henry of Ghent’s views could still be relevant for assessing contemporary ideas on education.
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>James als neurofenomenoloog</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977258</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977258</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:18:38 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			Emotions are ‘feelings of bodily changes’, according to William James (1884). This definition was the starting point of a debate that has been going on for more than a century now. James’ approach soon seemed empirically falsified by experimental psychologists and it was seriously undermined by philosophers who called his views untenable, because he seemed to reduce emotions to non-cognitive sensations. But time and again James rose from his grave. Today we witness his revival in the work of ‘neo-Jamesians’ like Jesse Prinz (2004) and ‘neo-phenomenologists’ like Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). In this article the main reactions to James’ ‘feelings of bodily changes’ are examined. My conclusion is that both his critics and his supporters have started from an incomplete interpretation of the theory. James’ pragmatically embedded psychology of emotion as the experience of a dynamic, bodily self has until today received insufficient philosophical attention.
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>The Missing Link</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977259</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977259</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:20:56 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			Contemporary philosophy of technology is usually characterized as being less dystopic, more pragmatic and more empirical than classical philosophy of technology. This article argues that a deeper, ontological commitment informs this move: a shift from a dualist and essentialist framework of human subjects and technological objects, to an understanding of the human and technology as intricately interwoven. This has important repercussions for human ontology, which takes on a fundamentally relational and material nature. But the identification of this anthropo-ontology raises two concerns: it remains all too implicit in the works of philosophers of technology, and further, it should aim to account for the material relationality of the human as a biological organism within the material matrix of human-technology collectives. This paper suggests that a means of addressing this latter concern is to look at models of biological inter-relationality in recent biological theory, where non-dualist and non-essentialist frameworks for thinking the relationship between organisms and their environments are also being developed. It is argued that such biological models can thus help provide a ‘missing link’ — the claim that the human, &lt;i&gt;qua biological organism&lt;/i&gt;, is inextricably interwoven with its material environment — within contemporary philosophy of technology’s ontological shift.
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Boekbesprekingen</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977260</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977260</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:22:22 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			Book reviews
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>In memoriam Hendrik Johan Adriaanse (1940-2012)</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977261</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977261</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:22:45 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			Obituary
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>In memoriam Jan Hendrik van den Berg (11 juni 1914, Deventer - 22 september 2012, Gorinchem)</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977262</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977262</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:23:04 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			Obituary
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Algemene kroniek</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977263</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977263</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:23:21 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			Chronicle
		</description>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Werken bij de redactie ingekomen</title>
		<author>poj@peeters-leuven.be</author>
		<guid>http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/TVF.75.1.2977264</guid>
		<link>http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&amp;id=2977264</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 11:23:41 GMT</pubDate>
		<description>
			Books received
		</description>
	</item>
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