Logique et Analyse
http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=journal&journal_code=LEA
Recent articlesData, Signals and Information in Digital Computationpoj@peeters-leuven.behttp://dx.doi.org/10.2143/LEA.241.0.3275102
http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=3275102
Thu, 08 Mar 2018 16:03:22 GMT
Claims that computation is a form of information processing are common in computer and cognitive sciences. Unsurprisingly, the notions of ‘information’ and ‘computation’ have become intimately intertwined. On the instructional information processing account, digital computation is a form of information processing. However, this account faces several problems, which stem from adopting Floridi’s conceptual framework of information, that are discussed here. We briefly examine Corning’s theory of control information as an alternative to Floridi’s framework. Since both are found unsuitable for the task of explaining computation as a form of information processing, another conceptual framework is defended, namely, that of functional information.
Logical Pluralism and Logical Formpoj@peeters-leuven.behttp://dx.doi.org/10.2143/LEA.241.0.3275103
http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=3275103
Thu, 08 Mar 2018 16:04:30 GMT
Disputes about logic are commonplace and undeniable. It is sometimes argued that these disputes are not genuine <i>disagreements</i>, but are rather merely verbal ones. Are advocates of different logics simply talking past each other? In this paper we argue that pluralists (and anyone who sees competing logics as genuine rivals), should reject the claim that real disagreement requires competing logics to assign the same meaning to logical connectives, or the same logical form to arguments. Along the way we argue that ascriptions of logical form, as well as connective meaning, are always theory-relative.
The Bayesian Account of the Defect in Moorean Reasoningpoj@peeters-leuven.behttp://dx.doi.org/10.2143/LEA.241.0.3275104
http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=3275104
Thu, 08 Mar 2018 16:06:32 GMT
Many Bayesians such as White and Silins have argued that Moorean reasoning is defective because it is a case where probabilistic support fails to transmit across the relevant entailment. In this paper, I argue against their claim. On the Bayesian argument, a skeptical hypothesis is that you are a brain in a vat that appears to have hands. To disclose the defect in Moorean reasoning, the Bayesian argument is supposed to show that its appearing to you as if you have hands does not increase the probability of a non-skeptical hypothesis such that you are not a brain in a vat. But what their argument really shows is rather a trivial fact that acquiring theses handlike experiences eliminates the possibility of not having these experiences, and so your having these experiences lowers the probability of the disjunctive claim that you are not a brain in a vat or it does not appear as if you have hands. Along these lines, I argue that what the Bayesian proof establishes has nothing to do with the defect in Moorean reasoning.
Comparing Classical and Relativistic Kinematics in First-Order Logicpoj@peeters-leuven.behttp://dx.doi.org/10.2143/LEA.241.0.3275105
http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=3275105
Thu, 08 Mar 2018 16:08:58 GMT
The aim of this paper is to present a new logic-based understanding of the connection between classical kinematics and relativistic kinematics. We show that the axioms of special relativity can be interpreted in the language of classical kinematics. This means that there is a logical translation function from the language of special relativity to the language of classical kinematics which translates the axioms of special relativity into consequences of classical kinematics. We will also show that if we distinguish a class of observers (representing observers stationary with respect to the 'Ether') in special relativity and exclude the non-slower-than light observers from classical kinematics by an extra axiom, then the two theories become definitionally equivalent (i.e., they become equivalent theories in the sense as the theory of lattices as algebraic structures is the same as the theory of lattices as partially ordered sets). Furthermore, we show that classical kinematics is definitionally equivalent to classical kinematics with only slower-than-light inertial observers, and hence by transitivity of definitional equivalence that special relativity theory extended with 'Ether' is definitionally equivalent to classical kinematics. So within an axiomatic framework of mathematical logic, we explicitly show that the transition from classical kinematics to relativistic kinematics is the knowledge acquisition that there is no 'Ether', accompanied by a redefinition of the concepts of time and space.