Ethical Perspectives

Introduction

poj@peeters-leuven.be — Wed, 19 Dec 2012 15:46:37 GMT

Introduction

Collective Responsibility and Global Poverty

poj@peeters-leuven.be — Wed, 19 Dec 2012 15:47:59 GMT

The present contribution aims to show why the notion of collective responsibility plays an essential role in our thinking about global poverty. It distinguishes outcome responsibility � where agents are held liable for the effects of their actions � from remedial responsibility � where agents are identified as having a special responsibility to rectify some harm � while arguing that the former is often the source of the latter. Outcome responsibility for global poverty must be attributed to collectives, especially nation-states, rather than individuals. But when is it appropriate to include individuals in outcome responsibility? Liberals are reluctant to do this unless a person has voluntarily chosen to join the collective. Through a series of examples, the article challenges this view, and shows that individuals in non-voluntary associations may only be able to avoid collective outcome responsibility by doing everything they reasonably can to oppose what the collective is doing. It then considers whether we could abandon collective outcome responsibility altogether, and assign remedial responsibility for global poverty simply on the basis of capacity to pay. It argues that if the rationale for this is to avoid assigning obligations to individuals as a result of the bad luck of involuntary membership, it does not succeed. It concludes by comparing states with nations as bearers of outcome responsibility, and claims that although there are practical advantages in focussing attention on states, it is often nations as amorphous groups that are really responsible for the outcomes we observe.

Why Open Borders?

poj@peeters-leuven.be — Wed, 19 Dec 2012 15:49:46 GMT

The present contribution offers a defence of open borders. It presents a critique of the idea that the state has a justified claim to regulate the movement of people because they reflect the collective endeavours of the members of the state to pursue a shared project of self-rule or self-determination. It argues that this view rests on an indefensible understanding of the nature of the state, which should be viewed less as a collective endeavour than as a product of conflicts among political elites. There is a strong prima facie case for free movement that suggests there should be a presumption in favour of open borders. The argument from self-determination is not a sound basis for justifying restrictions on the movement of people.

Global Responsibility and Distributive Justice

poj@peeters-leuven.be — Wed, 19 Dec 2012 15:51:41 GMT

The question posed in the present contribution is the following: can individual human beings and whole nations be expected to extend their concern for the welfare and relative social position to all people in the world? This is a question regarding the responsibility individuals and governments should assume regarding faraway people rather than of abstract principles of global justice. The concept of �prospective responsibility� is adopted as the most fitting to this question. The argument developed here is that human concern, and hence prospective responsibility, is limited by �special relations�, that is to say, cannot be globalized. The source of these restrictions is shown to be partly psychological and partly theoretical. The nature of these restrictions is analysed in the light of the ideal/non-ideal distinction and the way it applies to the local sphere of justice but not to the international. It is argued that contract-based justice is theoretically (not only empirically) impossible to universalize. Furthermore, prospective responsibility is typically assigned to individuals rather than to states, which can at most be held responsible to their own citizens. Finally, some non-contractual forms of global responsibility are discussed, like that of a superpower to other nations that are under threat of serious violation of justice, or that of the �international community� to which powerless nations or groups appeal for help. These are also shown to be based on some kind of special relations.

A Growing Problem?

poj@peeters-leuven.be — Wed, 19 Dec 2012 15:53:14 GMT

It is rare for discussions of climate justice to explore the challenges that a growing world population might present for mitigation and adaptation. Given the emotive nature of the issue, care must be taken that population growth is introduced in an appropriate way. Population growth is undeniably a factor in human impact on environmental systems, but this does not necessarily entail that it must be reduced if manipulating other variables can reduce overall impact. In the context of climate change, a discussion of responsibility for population increase requires engaging in the question of legitimate state policies to incentivise smaller families and to reduce fertility rates by measures such as promoting social justice, especially gender justice. It must also, however, address the other factors that contribute to human impact on global environmental systems. Examples of such factors include affluence and technology. This article argues that it cannot be permissible for a state to implement policies that make parents bear the full costs of their procreative decisions. Instead it suggests that there is a collective duty of a society to make investments and social changes to accommodate any population growth that might come about after permissible measures to reduce fertility rates are implemented.

Contribution to Collective Harms and Responsibility

poj@peeters-leuven.be — Wed, 19 Dec 2012 15:54:54 GMT

In the present contribution, I discuss the claim, endorsed by a number of authors, that contributing to a collective harm is the ground for special responsibilities to the victims of that harm. Contributors should, between them, cover the costs of the harms they have inflicted, at least if those harms would otherwise be rights-violating. I raise some doubts about the generality of this principle before moving on to sketch a framework for thinking about liability for the costs of harms in general. I build an account of how to think about liability for costs on the basis of the presumably attractive thought that individual agents should have as much control over their liabilities as is compatible with others having like control. I then use that framework to suggest that liability on the basis of contribution should be restricted to cases in which the contributors could have avoided their contribution relatively costlessly, meeting the liability is not crippling for them, and in which such a liability would not have chilling effects, either on them or on third parties. This account of the grounds for contributory liability also has the advantage of avoiding a number of awkward questions about what counts as a contribution by shifting the issue away from often unanswerable questions about the precise causal genesis of some harm or other. Instead, control over conduct, which plausibly has some relation to the harm, becomes crucial. On the basis of this account, I then investigate whether a number of uses of the contributory principle are entirely appropriate. I argue that contributory liability is not appropriate for cases of collective harms committed by coordinated groups in the way that, for example, Iris Marion Young and Thomas Pogge have suggested and that further investigation of how members of such groups may be liable will be needed.

Book Reviews

poj@peeters-leuven.be — Wed, 19 Dec 2012 15:55:08 GMT

Book reviews

Contributors

poj@peeters-leuven.be — Wed, 19 Dec 2012 15:55:26 GMT

Contributors